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Abstract
This document describes the specication of the MAFTIA middleware architecture.
This specication focusses on the models, building blocks and services. It describes the
tradeos made in terms of models, the choices of building blocks and their topology, and
the portfolio of services to be oered by the MAFTIA middleware to applications and high-
level services. In particular, regarding the system model, it presents a detailed discussion
on the fault, synchrony, topological, and group models, which were used to guide the
overall architecture. The architecture was divided into two main levels, the site part which
connects to the network and handles all inter-host operations, and a participant part which
takes care of all distributed activities and relies on the services provided by the site-part
components.
xi
xii
1 System Model
Paulo Verssimo, Nuno Ferreira Neves, Miguel Correia, University of Lisboa (P)
Christian Cachin, IBM Zurich Research Lab (CH)
Brian Randell, Robert Stroud, Ian Welch, University of Newcastle upon Tyne (UK)
1.1 Fault Model
A crucial aspect of any architecture is the fault model upon which the system archi-
tecture is conceived, and component interactions are dened. The fault model conditions
the correctness analysis, both in the value and time domains, and dictates crucial aspects
of system conguration, such as the placement and choice of components, level of redun-
dancy, types of algorithms, and so forth. There are essentially two dierent kinds of failure
assumptions underlying a fault model: controlled failure assumptions; and arbitrary failure
assumptions.
1.1.1 Failure Assumptions
Controlled failure assumptions specify qualitative and quantitative bounds on com-
ponent failures. For example, the failure assumptions may specify that components only
have timing failures, and that no more than f components fail during an interval of ref-
erence. Alternatively, they can admit value failures, but not allow components to spon-
taneously generate or forge messages, nor impersonate, collude with, or send conicting
information to other components. This approach is extremely realistic, since it represents
very well how common systems work under the presence of accidental faults, failing in a
benign manner most of the time. It can be extrapolated to malicious faults, by assuming
that they are qualitatively and quantitatively limited. However, it is traditionally diÆ-
cult to model the behaviour of a hacker, so we have a problem of coverage that does not
recommend this approach unless a solution can be found.
Arbitrary failure assumptions specify no qualitative or quantitative bounds on com-
ponent failures. Obviously, this should be understood in the context of a universe of
"possible" failures of the concerned operation mode of the component. For example, the
possible failure modes of interaction, between components of a distributed system are lim-
ited to combinations of timeliness, form, meaning, and target of those interactions (let us
call them messages). In this context, an arbitrary failure means the capability of generat-
ing a message at any time, with whatever syntax and semantics (form and meaning), and
sending it to anywhere in the system.
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Moreover, practical systems based on arbitrary failure assumptions very often spec-
ify quantitative bounds on component failures, or at least equate tradeos between re-
silience of their solutions and the number of failures eventually produced [7]. Arbitrary
failure assumptions are costly to handle, in terms of performance and complexity, and
thus are not compatible with the user requirements of the vast majority of today's on-line
applications.
Hybrid failure assumptions combining both kinds of failure assumptions would be
desirable. Generally, they consist of allocating dierent assumptions to dierent subsets
or components of the system, and have been used in a number of systems and protocols.
Hybrid models allow stronger assumptions to be made about parts of the system that can
justiably be assumed to exhibit fail-controlled behaviour, whilst other parts of the system
are still allowed an arbitrary behaviour. This is advantageous in modular and distributed
system architectures such as MAFTIA. However, this is only feasible when the model is
well-founded, that is, the behaviour of every single subset of the system can be modelled
and/or enforced with high coverage, and this brings us back, at least for parts of the
system, to the problem identied for controlled failure assumptions.
1.1.2 Composite Fault Model
The problems identied in our discussion of failure assumptions point to the need
for the MAFTIA fault model to have characteristics enabling the denition of intermediate,
hybrid assumptions, with adequate coverage. A rst step in this direction is the denition of
a composite fault model specically aimed at representing the failures that may result from
several classes of malicious faults. A second step is the denition of a set of techniques that
act at dierent points within this composite fault model and which, combined in several
ways, yield dependability vis-a-vis particular classes of faults. We are going to base our
reasoning on two guiding principles:
 the sequence: attack + vulnerability! intrusion ! failure
 the recursive use of fault tolerance and fault prevention
Concerning the mechanisms of failure, Figure 1.1 represents the fundamental se-
quence: attack + vulnerability ! intrusion ! failure. It distinguishes between several
kinds of faults capable of contributing to a security failure. Vulnerabilities are the primor-
dial faults existing inside the components, essentially design or conguration faults (e.g.,
coding faults allowing program stack overow, les with root setuid in UNIX, naive pass-
words, unprotected TCP/IP ports). Attacks are malicious interaction faults that attempt
to activate one or more of those vulnerabilities (e.g., port scans, email viruses, malicious
2
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Figure 1.1: The Composite Fault Model of MAFTIA.
Java applets or ActiveX controls). An attack that successfully activates a vulnerability
causes an intrusion. This further step towards failure is normally characterized by an er-
roneous state in the system that may take several forms (e.g., an unauthorized privileged
account with telnet access, a system le with undue access permissions to the hacker).
Such erroneous states can be unveiled by intrusion detection, as we will see ahead, but if
nothing is done to process the errors resulting from the intrusion, failure of one or more
security properties will occur.
The composite model embraced in MAFTIA allows the combined introduction of
several techniques. Note that two causes concur to create an intrusion, as shown in Fig-
ure 1.1: vulnerabilities and attacks.
To begin with, we can prevent some attacks from occurring, thereby reducing the
level of threat imposed on the system. Attack prevention can be performed, for example,
by selectively ltering access to parts of the system (e.g., if a component is behind a rewall
and cannot be accessed from the Internet, it cannot be attacked from there). However, it
is impossible to prevent all attacks (e.g., some components have to be placed outside the
rewall in a Demilitarised Zone), and in consequence, other measures must be taken.
On the vulnerability side, vulnerability prevention helps to reduce the degree of vul-
nerability by construction. However, many systems are assembled from COTS components
that contain known vulnerabilities. When it is not possible to prevent the attack(s) that
would activate these vulnerabilities, a rst step would be to attempt vulnerability removal.
Sometimes this is done at the cost of eliminating the system functions that contain the
vulnerabilities.
The above-mentioned approaches can be complemented, still at the attack level,
with tolerance measures achieved by combinations of the classic techniques: detection,
recovery, and masking. The detection of port scans or other anomalous activity at the
external border of the system forms part of the functionality of some systems generically
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known as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Although an intrusion has not yet occurred,
there is an erroneous symptom that can be addressed by several attack countermeasures.
For example, honey-pots and other evasive measures at the periphery of the system can
be used to mask the eects of the attack.
The various combinations of techniques discussed above provide a range of alter-
natives for achieving intrusion prevention (see Figure 1.1), i.e. attempting to avoid the
occurrence of intrusions. Whilst this is a valid and widely used approach, its absolute suc-
cess cannot be guaranteed in all situations, and for all systems. The reason is obvious: it
may not be possible to handle all attacks, either because not all attacks are known or new
ones may appear, or because not all attacks can be guaranteed to be detected or masked.
Similar reasoning applies to vulnerabilities. In consequence, some attacks will succeed in
producing intrusions, requiring forms of intrusion tolerance, as shown in the right part
of Figure 1.1, in order to prevent system failure. Again, these can assume several forms:
detection (e.g., of intruded account activity, of Trojan horse activity); recovery (e.g., inter-
ception and neutralization of intruder activity); or masking (e.g., voting between several
components, including a minority of intruded ones) [34].
The above discussion has laid the foundations for achieving our objective: a well-
founded hybrid fault model, that is, one where dierent components have dierent faulty
behaviours. Consider a component for which a given controlled failure assumption was
made. How can we achieve coverage of such an assumption, given the unpredictability
of attacks and the elusiveness of vulnerabilities? The key is in a recursive use of fault
tolerance and fault prevention. Think of the component as a system: it can be constructed
through the combined use of removal of internal vulnerabilities, prevention of some attacks,
and implementation of intrusion tolerance mechanisms internal to the component, in order
to prevent the component from exhibiting failures.
Looked upon from the outside now, at the next higher level of abstraction, the level
of the outer system, the would-be component failures we prevented restrict the system
faults the component can produce. In fact we have performed fault prevention, that is, we
have a component with a controlled behaviour vis--vis malicious faults. This principle:
 establishes a divide-and-conquer strategy for building modular fault-tolerant systems;
 can be applied in dierent ways to any component;
 can be applied recursively at as many levels of abstraction as are found to be useful.
Components exhibit a coverage that is justiably given by the techniques used in
their implementation, and can subsequently be used in the construction of fault-tolerant
protocols under the hybrid fault model.
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Since we are dealing with systems of interacting components we should also address
error connement. Errors can propagate from one component to another when messages
are sent from one component to another component. One approach to conning errors is to
replicate components, and apply a message selection protocol that validates the messages
generated by the replicated components before they are propagated. The selection pro-
tocol cross-checks each message against equivalent data messages generated by the other
replicas and only sends messages that the majority of replicas agree upon. Thus, messages
are only propagated if the replicas reach a consensus about them. The drawback of this
validate-before-propagate [76] approach is that every replica must agree to send a message,
so propagation is limited by the slowest replica in the group. A more eÆcient approach is
propagate-before-validate [76]. With this approach the rst replica to generate a message
propagates the message to other components without any validation taking place. However,
at some later point the computation being carried out by the components is suspended
until all previous computation is validated. One plausible implementation approach would
be to use a transactional framework. All interacting components would join a transaction
and before commitment could take place, all message sending would be suspended and all
messages sent during the transaction would be validated by cross-checking the messages
generated by component replicas. If any of the messages were invalid then the transac-
tion would be aborted and rollback would take place, otherwise the transaction would be
committed and the eects of the message interchange made permanent.
This approach was originally developed for components that were active replicas.
We would like to apply the concept to general components. However, standard transac-
tional frameworks are unsuitable for this as they support only backward error recovery
and a general component may not support rollback. Therefore the framework used for er-
ror connement should support forward recovery techniques as well as backward recovery
techniques. The coordinated atomic actions (CA actions) concept [106] [107] may oer a
suitable framework. CA actions are intended for cooperating or competing general com-
ponents involved in a joint interaction and impose strong controls on error connement
and error recovery activities in the event of failure. The implementation of the CA action
mechanism would need to be made both fault tolerant and secure to be used as a framework
for error connement in a intrusion tolerant system. Therefore, as part of the MAFTIA
project we intend to investigate the usefulness of an extended concept of CA actions for
error connement.
1.1.3 Classes of Threats
In an adversarial environment, making assumptions about the presumed behavior
of an opponent is diÆcult. The failure assumptions developed in the previous sections
essentially determine the general form of the attacks that we want to defend against. In
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other words, we can say they determine which actions of the opponent are considered legal.
But beyond that, there is not much that can be said in a security context, since a malicious
attacker may invest more resources into an attack than presumed, and/or use its power in
arbitrary ways.
The approach taken in security engineering and cryptography is that an adversary
always knows the complete design and specication of the system, with the sole exception of
the secret keys. This prudent principle, known as Kerckho's assumption, has proven over
and over to be an extremely reasonable way to design cryptographically secure systems.
The history of cryptography is littered with broken systems whose security rested on their
design specications remaining condential (so-called security by obscurity). They typically
were broken soon after some outsider had access to the algorithms|the GSM encryption
algorithm and the DVD \content scrambling system" algorithm are only the most recent
examples. We shall follow Kerckho's assumption as a general design principle.
Several established methods for enhancing fault-tolerance rely on replication to
mask faulty parties. For a homogeneous distributed system, imagine that there exist n
servers, of which up to t may fail in arbitrary ways. We assume that there is a single,
global adversary that has corrupted up to t parties. They may exhibit arbitrary behavior,
so we cannot rely on them in any form. For simplicity, we typically absorb them into the
adversary and do not regard them as part of the system at all. The remaining parties are
called honest. Any statement about the common state of the system can only rely on the
honest parties.
Since the network is insecure, we may also assume that the protocol execution is
dened entirely by the adversary within the imposed timing bounds. The adversary has
arbitrary computational power within the limits of what is considered to be reasonable
(technically speaking, it must be modeled as a polynomial-time Turing machine) and the
boundaries imposed by the system model. Thus, the adversary controls the network,
delivers messages at its discretion, and schedules the actions of honest parties. Protocols
formulated in this model are not guaranteed to work unconditionally, but only to the extent
that the adversary delivers messages between honest parties. In short, the network is the
adversary. This view also takes denial-of-service attacks into account in a feasible way.
In a security context with cryptographic secrets, the above model must be inter-
preted such that a faulty party is regarded as faulty for the remaining lifetime of the system,
or at least until the system recongures such that its cryptographic secrets are no longer
useful to the adversary. A simple recovery procedure is not eective, in particular, when
threshold-cryptographic protocols are used (see also Section 2.2.2). A malicious intruder
cannot be forced to forget something he has seen; in a fault tolerance context, the solution
is to render this knowledge useless to him. This may rely for example on so-called proactive
security mechanisms.
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Proactive security is a method to protect threshold-cryptographic schemes against
a mobile adversary that can corrupt all parties during the lifetime of the system, but never
more than t at once (see [22] for a survey). Proactive protocols divide time into epochs.
All parties \reshare" their cryptographic secret keys between two epochs and delete all old
key material. The model assumes an external mechanism for detecting corruptions and
\cleaning up" a party. Because all secrets that the adversary has seen in the past become
useless by resharing, the adversary never knows enough secret information to compromise
the whole system.
1.1.4 Classes of Vulnerabilities
A thorough understanding of the vulnerabilities in a distributed system will help to
identify and prevent or detect attacks capable of exploiting them. This is the main focus
of intrusion detection research, performed in WP3 in MAFTIA. In this section we give
a short classication of attacks and vulnerabilities and refer to [2] and to the respective
deliverables in WP3 for further information.
One can distinguish the attack types according to three parameters. Firstly, we
identify the attacked object, then the attack point through which the object is attacked and
thirdly, the attack principle used by the adversary to attack the object. In principle, this
classication should enable us to recognize potential vulnerabilities. It can also serve the
evaluation of intrusion-detection systems.
A distributed computing system consists of many objects. Our classication is
limited to a rather high level of granularity. On the level of a single system, the relevant
objects include storage and le systems, I/O devices (network interface, keyboard), volatile
memory, operating system, and processes. On the network level, the objects include the
transport medium, directory and name servers, routers, rewalls, proxies, and more.
The second parameter is used to denote the point through which a given object is
attacked. These are normally the interfaces provided for the intended usage of an object.
Thus, for system objects, these are kernel modules, system calls, library calls, environment
settings, user interface abstractions, etc. On the network level, basically any layer in a
protocol stack oers interfaces that can be attacked.
The third parameter, the attack principle, is particularly important for designing
intrusion-detection systems that should recognize attacks by their typical characteristics.
Typical principles are bypassing access control, fooling authentication by exploiting other
vulnerabilities, or creating, deleting, and modifying objects to change the behavior of the
system.
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1.1.5 Adversary Structures
One common approach in fault-tolerant distributed systems is to mask faults by
replication. Usually it is assumed that at most a certain fraction in a set of servers may
fail. This model is based on the assumption that faults occur independently of each other
and aect all servers equally likely. For random and uncorrelated faults within a system,
as well as for isolated external events, this seems adequate.
However, faults that represent malicious acts of an adversary may not always match
these assumptions. This causes a conceptual obstacle for using the replication-based ap-
proach to achieve security in adversarial environments. In our setting, for example, if
all servers in the system have a common vulnerability that permits a successful attack
by an intruder, the integrity of the whole system may be violated easily. The indepen-
dence assumption applies here only to the extent that the work needed for breaking into a
server increases linearly with the number of machines that have to broken for a successful
intrusion. With the sophisticated tools, automated exploit scripts, and large-scale coordi-
nated attacks found on the Internet today, this assumption becomes increasingly diÆcult
to justify.
Heterogeneity is a helpful paradigm, which further increases the above-mentioned
notion of \diÆculty to intrude". Suppose we implement a replicated server using several
makes of operating system. Note that for a given vulnerability of one operating system,
we can specify a bound on the number of components that can be intruded upon, by a
single attack exploiting that vulnerability.
Generalized Adversary Structures
One solution for this problem, which we propose here, is to use generalized adversary
structures. They can accommodate a strictly more general class of failures than with any
weighted threshold structure. In the Byzantine model, a collection of corruptible servers
is also called an adversary structure. Such an adversary structure species the subsets of
parties that may be corrupted at the same time.
Let P = f1; : : : ; ng denote the index set of all parties P
1
, . . . , P
n
. The adversary
structure A is a family of subsets of P that species which parties the adversary may
corrupt. A is monotone (i.e., S 2 A and T  S imply T 2 A) and uniquely determined
by the corresponding maximal adversary structure A

in which no subset contains another
one. For the traditional threshold model of a threshold of corrupted parties, the adversary
may corrupt up to t arbitrary parties. In this case, A

contains all subsets of P with
cardinality t.
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Most protocols impose certain restrictions on the type of corruptions that they can
tolerate. For a threshold adversary in an asynchronous model, n > 3t is in general a
necessary and suÆcient condition. The analogous condition for protocols with a general
adversary structure A is the so-called Q
3
condition [47]: no three of the sets in A cover P.
(Note that n > 3t is a special case of this.)
The adversary structure species the (maximally) corruptible subsets of parties. Its
complement is called the access structure and species the (minimally) qualied subsets
that are needed to take some action. For example, it is used in secret sharing in cryp-
tography [95], where it denotes the sets of parties who may reconstruct the shared secret.
The access structure is usually the more important tool for the protocol designer than the
adversary structure. In the example of the threshold system above, all sets of t+1 or more
parties belong to the access structure.
Every adversary structure can also be described by a Boolean function g on n
variables that represent a subset of P; g outputs 0 on all characteristic vectors of corruptible
subsets and 1 otherwise. For convenience, we describe them using arbitrary fan-in threshold
gates 
n
k
that output 1 if and only if at least k of their n inputs are 1 (note that and
and or gates correspond to the special cases 
n
n
and 
n
1
). By associating subsets of P
with their characteristic n-bit vector in the natural way, the function can be extended from
Boolean values to arbitrary subsets of P (e.g., g(S) = 
n
t+1
(S) in the threshold example).
Handling General Adversary Structures
Most threshold cryptography and agreement protocols traditionally found in the
literature can be extended to a generalized Q
3
adversary structure A, for which the cor-
responding secret sharing access structure can be implemented by a linear secret sharing
scheme. This follows from the results of Cramer, Damgard, and Maurer [31], who show
how to construct cryptographically secure schemes for general operations on secret values.
The existence of a suitable linear secret sharing scheme is important, and we will
have to describe suitable secret sharing schemes together with the protocols. For example,
it seems reasonable to dierentiate between groups of servers who share the same values
of a particular attribute, such as location or operations system.
The change aects some details in the protocol and in the cryptographic operations,
but there are no essential diÆculties. The agreement and broadcast protocols need to be
changed as follows:
 Where a set of n  t values is required, take all values in P n S for some S 2 A

.
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 Where 2t+1 values are needed, take all values in S [T [fig for any S; T 2 A

with
S \ T = ; and i 62 S [ T .
 Where t + 1 values are needed, take all values in S [ fig for any S 2 A

and i 62 S.
1.2 Synchrony Model
The relevance of the choice of synchrony model has its roots in the tradeo between
safety of the fully asynchronous model, and eectiveness of the fully synchronous one. We
will guide the reader through the reasoning that led us to adopt a partially synchronous
model to support our algorithms and protocols. We will see that the construct we propose
(the Trusted Timely Computing Base) can be used to support the correct execution of
both timed and time-free protocols.
1.2.1 Tradeos Between Asynchrony and Synchrony
Research in distributed systems algorithms has traditionally been based on one of
two canonical models: fully asynchronous and fully synchronous models. For a detailed
discussion on this see [104]. Asynchronous models do not allow timeliness specications.
They are time-free, that is, they are characterized by an absolute independence of time.
Distributed systems based on such models typically have the following characteris-
tics
1
:
Pa 1 Unbounded or unknown processing delays
Pa 2 Unbounded or unknown message delivery delays
Pa 3 Unbounded or unknown rate of drift of local clocks
Pa 4 Unbounded or unknown dierence of local clocks
Asynchronous models obviously resist timing attacks, i.e. attacks on the timing
assumptions of the model (i.e., the existence of an upper bound for an action), which are
non-existent in this case. However, because of their time-free nature, asynchronous models
cannot solve timed problems. However, timeliness is part of the required functionality of
1
Pa3 and Pa4 are tautologies listed for a better comparison with the synchronous model characteristics
listed later. A local clock in a time-free system is nothing else than a sequence counter, and for that reason
clock synchronization is also impossible.
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interactive applications, such as on-line operations on the stock market, multimedia, air
traÆc control. For example, they cannot address Quality of Service (QoS) specications,
which are of increasing importance in the measure of the quality of transactional systems
in open networks such as the Internet (e.g., stock exchange, e-commerce). "False" asyn-
chronous algorithms have been deployed over the years, exhibiting subtle but real failures,
thanks to the inappropriate use of timeouts in a supposedly time-free model.
In addition, asynchronous models preclude the deterministic solution of interesting
problems, such as consensus or Byzantine agreement [41]: only probabilistic solutions work
in this case. Besides, the only way asynchronous models can reason in terms of causality
between events is in a logical way, and this is insuÆcient if hidden communication channels
exist between participants. Causality or cause-eect order is a crucial factor of correctness
in some interactive and competitive applications (e.g., trading orders to a stock trading
oor, bidding in a virtual market place).
In practice, many of the emerging applications we see today, particularly on the
Internet, have interactivity or mission-criticality requirements. That is, service must be
provided on time, either because of user-dictated quality-of-service requirements (e.g., net-
work transaction servers, multimedia rendering, synchronized groupware), or because of
dependability constraints (e.g., command-and-control applications such as air traÆc con-
trol or emergency networks).
Synchronous models allow timeliness specications. In this type of model, it is pos-
sible to solve all the hard problems (e.g., consensus, atomic broadcast, clock synchroniza-
tion) [25]. Synchronous models are characterized by having known bounds for processing
and message delivery delays, and for the rate of drift and dierence among local clocks.
In consequence, such models solve timed problem specications, one precondition for at
least a subset of the applications targeted in MAFTIA, for the reasons explained above.
Imagine for example the hardness of implementing real-time stock exchange transactions
on the Internet, based on real-time quotes, and with temporal order between competitive
requests, to ensure market fairness. Synchronous systems are characterized by the following
properties:
Ps 1 There exists a known bound for processing delays
Ps 2 There exists a known bound for message delivery delays
Ps 3 There exists a known bound for the rate of drift of local clocks
Ps 4 There exists a known bound for the dierence among local clocks
It is easy to see that synchronous models are susceptible to time-based attacks, since
they make strong assumptions about things happening on time. Technically, timeliness
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is expressed in two ways: positioning events in the timeline and determining execution
durations. Synchronous models are fragile in terms of the coverage of such timeliness
specications. Timing bounds are assumed to be valid for correct processes, and conversely
their validity must not be compromised by incorrect processes. Both are diÆcult to achieve.
For example, algorithms based on messages arriving by a certain time may fail if the
communication system has performance unstability. Likewise, reading the actual global
time from a clock, may fail in dangerous ways if manipulated by an adversary [44]. Likewise,
causal delivery order of messages or event trace analysis based on physical timestamps may
be disturbed to the advantage of a hacker who, for example, manipulates the time-stamping
facility.
1.2.2 Partial Synchrony
The introductory words above explain why synchronism is more than a mere cir-
cumstantial attribute in distributed systems subjected to malicious faults: absence of time
is detrimental to quality of service; presence of time increases vulnerability. Restrictions
to the asynchrony of time-free systems have been addressed in earlier studies [35, 38]
but timed partially synchronous models have deservedly received great attention in recent
times. They yield better results, essentially for three reasons: (i) they allow timeliness spec-
ications; (ii) they admit failure of those specications; (iii) they provide timing failure
detection.
Previous timed partially synchronous models, such as the quasi-synchronous [99]
and the timed-asynchronous models [29], share the same observation: synchronism or
asynchronism are not homogeneous properties of systems. That is, they vary with time,
and they vary with the part of the system being considered. However, each model has
treated these asymmetries in its own way: some relied on the evolution of synchronism
with time, others with space or with both. Synchronism assumptions were not totally
transparent to applications, and architectural constructs were rarely used to enforce these
assumptions.
We are particularly interested in a model based on the existence of a timely comput-
ing base, which is both a timely execution assistant and a timing failure detection oracle
that ensures time-domain correctness of applications in environments of uncertain synchro-
nism [101]. The timely computing base model addresses a broader spectrum of problems
than those solved by previous timed partially synchronous models. In the timely comput-
ing base model, it is assumed that systems have an architecture such that applications,
however asynchronous they may be and whatever their scale, can rely on services provided
by a special module which is timely and reliable. That is, the time-related aspects may be
conned to the timely computing base part, and in consequence, the application may even
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be time-free.
This research has focused on benign (non-arbitrary, non-malicious) failure modes.
However, the architectural characteristics of the timely computing base enable its extension
in order to be resilient to value- as well as time-domain failures. This contributes to
supporting what we described earlier as the hybrid fault model of MAFTIA, encompassing
malicious faults whilst guaranteeing system timeliness in a much more robust way than
fully synchronous models would.
Besides, since the model allows any degree of asynchrony, both timed and time-free
applications can be supported by the same infrastructure. This assumes great relevance,
since it will be necessary to have algorithms of both classes, in order to support the expected
tradeos between timeliness and robustness vis--vis malicious faults.
We address these issues with more detail in the sections to follow.
1.2.3 The Trusted Timely Computing Base
We call such an extended model, whose development we pursue in the MAFTIA
project, a Trusted Timely Computing Base, or TTCB. In one sense, a TTCB has similar
design principles to the very well known paradigm in security of a Trusted Computing
Base (TCB) [1]. However, the objectives are drastically dierent. A TCB aims at fault
prevention, in order to ensure that the whole state and resources of services runnning on the
TCB are tamper-proof. It is based on logical correctness and makes no attempt to reason
in terms of time. In contrast, a TTCB aims at fault tolerance: application components can
be tampered with, some may fail, but the whole application should not fail. To ensure that,
it can only count on being able to make a few priviledged calls to the TTCB, which ensures
a set of minimal trusted and timely services. In other words, a TTCB is an architectural
artefact supporting the construction and trusted execution of fault-tolerant protocols and
applications.
In essence, the TTCB must follow a few construction principles to guarantee its
behaviour in the presence of faults:
 Interposition: it must by construction be interposed between vital resources and any
attempt to interact with them.
 Shielding: the TTCB construction is such that it itself is protected (1) from faults
aecting timeliness and (2) from faults aecting security.
 Validation: the TTCB functionality is such that it allows the implementation of
veriable mechanisms w.r.t. both to (1) timeliness and (2) security.
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The architecture of a system with a TTCB is suggested by Figure 1.2.
The rst relevant aspect is that the heterogeneity of system properties is incorpo-
rated into the system architecture. There is a generic or payload system, over a payload
network. This pregures what is normally "the system" in homogeneous architectures, that
is, the place where participants resident in the several hosts run distributed applications.
Additionally, there is a control part, made of local TTCB modules, interconnected
by some form of medium, the control network. We will refer to this set-up as the distributed
TTCB, or simply TTCB when there is no ambiguity. The protocols and software modules
implementing the payload applications can rely on the assistance of the TTCB services.
The model puts no limits on how asynchronous the payload applications can be,
and how hardly they can be attacked. Concrete systems will be specied (and built) with
the degree of synchronism and level of threat which is commensurate with the application
in mind.
The second relevant aspect of the TTCB is that its well-dened properties should
be preserved by construction, regardless of the properties of applications running with its
assistance: it is synchronous, and it is trusted to execute as specied, being resilient to
intrusions. This casts the notion of component with fail-controlled (or fault-preventive)
behaviour in the architecture, even with regard to malicious faults, as proposed in the
hybrid fault model introduced in Section 1.1.
Host A
TTCB
Payload
Network
TTCB
TTCB
Control System/Network
Payload
System
Host C
Host B
Figure 1.2: Trusted Timely Computing Base Model
Unlike the classic TCB, the TTCB can be a fairly modest and simple component
of the system, used as an assistant for parts of the execution of the payload protocols and
applications. When assisting timed fault-tolerant protocols, it can help achieve both time-
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liness and safety properties of the former (especially those related with security properties).
When assisting time-free protocols, it can help achieve safety properties, not only those
related with security properties, but those general safety properties that require a minimal
synchronism even in time-free systems, such as perfect crash failure detection [25].
Moreover, depending on the type of application, it is not necessary that all sites
have a local TTCB. Consider the development of a fault-tolerant TTP (Trusted Third
Party) based on a group of replicas that collectively ensure the correct behaviour of the
TTP service vis--vis malicious faults. One possibility is for the replica group activity to be
based on algorithms that support an arbitrary failure mode of all system components at
all instants (e.g., asynchronous randomized Byzantine Agreement), with the corresponding
penalty in performance and lack of timeliness. Alternatively, the replica group management
may rely on simpler algorithms, generically supporting an arbitrary level of threat, except
for the bits executed on the TTCB, which for the matter is a synchronous subsystem with
a benign (intrusion-free) failure mode. Running those bits of the algorithm on the TTCB
substantiates the otherwise unsustainable claim of \partially benign behaviour".
A TTCB should be built in a way that secures both the synchronism properties
mentioned earlier, and its correct behaviour vis--vis malicious faults. In consequence, a
local TTCB can be either a special hardware module, such as a tamperproof device, an
auxiliary rmware-based microcomputer board, or a software-based real-time and security
kernel running on a plain desktop machine such as a PC or workstation. Likewise, a dis-
tributed TTCB assumes the existence of a timely inter-module communication channel.
This channel can assume several forms exhibiting dierent levels of timeliness and re-
silience. It may or not be based on a physically dierent network from the one supporting
the payload channel. Virtual channels with predictable timing characteristics coexisting
with essentially asynchronous channels are feasible in some of the current networks. The
IETF is studying several approaches to achieve this behaviour in the Internet [65, 49].
Virtual channels with predictable timing characteristics coexisting with essentially asyn-
chronous channels are feasible in some current networks, even over the Internet [87]. Such
virtual channels can be made secure through virtual private network (VPN) techniques,
which consist of building secure cryptographic IP tunnels linking all TTCB modules to-
gether, and these techniques are now supported by standards [52]. On a timeliness side,
it should be observed that the bandwidth required of the control channel is bound to be
much smaller than that of the payload channel. In more demanding scenarios, one may
resort to alternative networks (real-time LAN, ISDN connection, GSM Short Message Ser-
vice, GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) or UMTS, Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite
communication).
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The Basic TTCB Services
The TTCB provides the following services related to time: trusted timely execution;
trusted absolute timestamping; trusted duration measurement; trusted timing failure de-
tection. They are trusted versions of the timely computing base services presented in [102],
except for absolute timestamping, which was included recognising the need for interactive
applications on open systems to be referenced to absolute time (e.g., TAI or UTC). The
outputs of all these services are trusted to be correct and authentic (e.g., they can be
signed by the TTCB with its private key, see below).
The services have a distributed scope, although they are provided to processes via
the local TTCB instantiations. Any service may be provided to more than one user in the
system. For example, recall that the MAFTIA Reference Model foresees the capability of
providing \insecurity signals" both to layers above and to System Administration. The
failure notications produced by the trusted timing failure service are an example of such
a signal, which may be given to all interested users.
We dene below the properties of the services. The properties are dened as seen
at the TTCB interface. We start with trusted timely execution. Trusted Timely Execution
relies on the following property of the TTCB:
TTCB 1 Given any function F with an execution time bounded by a known constant
T
Xmax
, and given a delay time lower-bounded by a known constant T
Xmin
 0, for
any execution of the function triggered at real time t
start
, the TTCB does not start the
execution of F within T
Xmin
from t
start
, and terminates F within T
Xmax
from t
start
Timely Execution allows the TTCB to execute arbitrary functions deterministically,
given a feasible T
Xmax
. The executions can be delayed (T
Xmin
), such as those resulting
from timeouts.
Absolute Timestamping is achieved by the following:
TTCB 2 Given any event e
i
occurring in any node, at real time t
i
, the TTCB measures
t
i
as T
i
, and the error of T
i
is bounded by a known value.
The trusted absolute timestamping service provides a timestamp (it can be Authen-
ticated, e.g., signed with a TTCB private key). A timestamp produced in any local TTCB
is immediately meaningful to any other TTCB (in the sites where one exists) since local
clocks are synchronized, and it is also meaningful for any external entity referenced to real
time, since clocks are also externally synchronised to an absolute time reference. This is
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stronger than the initial model in [101], but very much helpful to order events inside the
system vis--vis external but absolute-time-referenced events. Some applications in mind
for MAFTIA, e.g. nancial and electronic commerce, will have such needs.
Duration Measurement relies on another property:
TTCB 3 Given any two events e
s
and e
e
occurring in any two nodes, respectively at real
times t
s
and t
e
, t
s
< t
e
, the TTCB measures the duration between e
s
and e
e
as T
se
,
and the error of T
se
is bounded by a known value.
The property TTCB 3 may seem redundant with TTCB 2. But in fact, it may
happen that there is an internal ordering mechanism that supplies TTCB 3 with better
precision than the one achieved by using absolute timestamp subtraction given by TTCB2.
Another crucial service of the TTCB is trusted timing failure detection. If we dene
timed actions as operations that have timeliness properties, then they have to be executed
in a given interval of time after an instant. A timing failure happens when a timeliness
property of a timed action is violated. The Timing Failure Detection service is dened
using an adaptation of the terminology of Chandra [25]:
TTCB 4 Timed Strong Completeness: There exists T
TFDmax
such that given a timing
failure at p in any timed action X(p; e; T
A
; t
A
), the TTCB detects it within T
TFDmax
from t
e
TTCB 5 Timed Strong Accuracy: There exists TTFDmin such that any timed action
X(p; e; T
A
; t
A
) that does not terminate within  T
TFDmin
from t
e
is considered timely
by the TTCB if the local TTCB does not crash until t
e
+ T
TFDmax
The majority of detectors known are crash failure detectors. We introduce tim-
ing failure detectors (TFD). Timed Strong Completeness can be understood as follows:
\strong" species that any timing failure is perceived by all correct processes; \timed"
species that the failure is perceived at most within T
TFDmax
of its occurrence. In essence,
it species the detection latency of the TFD. Timed Strong Accuracy can also be un-
derstood under the same perspective: \strong" means that no timely action is wrongly
detected as a timing failure; but \timed" qualies what is meant by \timely", by requiring
the action to occur not later than a set-up interval T
TFDmin
before the detection threshold
t
e
. In essence, it species the detection accuracy of the TFD.
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The TTCB Security-Related Services
The TTCB was initially dened as an extension of the timely computing base for
malicious environments. However, it was found opportune to include some security-related
services inside the TTCB since these services can take advantage of the properties of the
TTCB, i.e., of its trustworthiness and timeliness by construction. Three criteria were used
to dene the security related services of the TTCB:
 They must be highly trusted.
 They must be \lightweight" for the TTCB to be veriable.
 They should be a minimal set that assists and not replaces the implementation of
middleware building blocks.
An obvious use for the local TTCBs is authentication of the site where it belongs.
The TTCB is trusted, tamper-proof, so it is probably one of the few places in a system
secure enough to save a long-term private key. The corresponding public key can be
published (e.g., using a PKI) so that other entities can authenticate whatever is produced
by the TTCB. Incidentally, the private key can also be used to sign the output of all TTCB
services, as suggested above, in case there is a need for checking integrity and authenticity.
The security-related services of the TTCB are dened informally below:
Trusted Random Number Generation: This service generates trustworthy random num-
bers.
Trusted Block Consensus: This service achieves consensus on a xed size block of data
between local TTCBs.
Participant-TTCB Authentication (and key establishment): This service mutually
authenticates a local participant (e.g., a local process or application, or an applet in-
side a Smartcard) and the local TTCB, and establishes a shared key between them.
Participant-Participant Authentication (and key establishment): This service can
be used for two or more participants resident in the same or dierent hosts to au-
thenticate themselves mutually through the TTCB. A shared key is established.
Random numbers are essential for building cryptographic primitives and it is im-
portant that they are trusted to be random. Block consensus is not intended for consensus
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operations on payload data, but it may be used to perform very simple but crucial deci-
sion steps in more complex payload protocols. The shared key established in the mutual
authentication, either between a participant and its local TTCB, or between two partici-
pants, can be used for them to communicate securely, establishing a trusted path. Other
TTCB services can optionally be invoked over this path.
1.2.4 Timed Approach
The timely computing base work is based on the assumption that a general model
can be devised that encompasses the entire spectrum of partial synchrony [103, 100, 30],
from fully asynchronous to fully synchronous.
Of course, it serves extremely well those timed applications that fall in between,
and which, in spite of having a notion of timeliness (i.e., time bounds, deadlines, etc.),
cannot always fulll these requirements adequately. The common denominator of systems
belonging to that realm is that they can exhibit timing failures, i.e., they can violate
timeliness properties.
In consequence, a programming model can be devised, based on three notions:
 The payload system, although timed, has uncertain timeliness.
 The control system (the TTCB), can assist an application running on the payload
system, to determine useful facts about time (be sure it executed something on time;
measure a duration; determine it was late doing something).
 The payload system, despite being imperfect (it suers timing faults, some of which
may result from attacks) can react (implement fault tolerance mechanisms) based on
reliable information about presence or absence of errors (provided by the TTCB at
its interface).
That is, given the baseline partial synchronism of a payload application, there are
no guarantees about the actual time of invocation or completion of services and functions
by the former, including TTCB services. Furthermore, those instants and durations can
be manipulated by an adversary, with the intent of intruding the system. Accidental or
not, timing failures in system components may lead to the violation of safety properties
of the system, and lead to its failure, if nothing is done. However, the TTCB can provide
crucial information about what is happening in the payload system, so that it can recover
from abnormal situations and still achieve the provision of correct service.
19
In consequence, what we propose here is a programming model that lets the pro-
grammer build applications satisfying timeliness requirements, because these are crucial
for the emerging interactive services on the Internet. Those applications must work under
assumptions which can be considered optimistic with regard to time, since: (i) they will be
technically hard to achieve in such large-scale environments; (ii) they will be susceptible
to attacks on the very timing aspects. Should the system be left to itself, this might have
undesirable or even catastrophic consequences, given that those assumptions might fail un-
wittingly to the system (lack of coverage). However, we provide the system with an oracle
(the TTCB) capable of supplying information on how the (payload) system is doing w.r.t.
timeliness, so that the system may itself react and avoid failure, should it have accidental
or malicious timing faults.
Additionally, the TTCB, which is the only part of the system required to be tamper-
proof, also has the capability of providing a few basic but crucial security-related services,
which are trusted as supplied at the TTCB interface with the payload system compo-
nents. We expect these services| such as random number generation, basic consensus and
authentication| to be of use for the implementation of eÆcient fault tolerant protocols
resilient to arbitrary (accidental and malicious) faults.
The denition of the interface to these services is thus a very important problem,
which will be addressed in a forthcoming document. Essentially, the interface has to make
the bridge between a synchronous and trusted environment (the TTCB), and a potentially
asynchronous and untrusted one (the payload system).
1.2.5 Time-free Approach
One may also adopt the asynchronous model and work with in a completely time-
free environment. Of course, asynchronous protocols cannot guarantee a bound on the
overall response time of an application, but they were never meant to. In general, an
asynchronous model provides a conceptually simple and nice framework for developing and
reasoning about the correctness of an algorithm, such that it satises liveness and integrity
under all timing conditions. This has some advantages for the design of secure distributed
systems, which is one reason for pursuing such a model in the context of MAFTIA. In fact,
sometimes it is necessary and worthwhile to sacrice timeliness for resilience.
Let us analyse a little better how timed algorithms can be attacked. Specifying
timeout values may be very diÆcult when protecting against arbitrary failures that may
be caused by a malicious attacker. It is usually much easier for an intruder to block
communication with a server than to subvert it. As mentioned before, prudent security
engineering assumes that an attacker has full access to all specications, including timeouts,
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and keeps only cryptographic keys secret. Even with only partial control of the network,
such an adversary may simply delay the communication to a server for a little longer than
the timeout and the server appears faulty to the rest of the system.
Time-based failure detectors [25] can easily be fooled into making an unlimited
number of wrong failure suspicions about honest parties like this. This problem arises
because one crucial assumption underlying the failure detector approach, namely that the
system is stable for some longer periods when the failure detector is accurate, may fail
against a malicious adversary. A clever adversary may subvert a server and make it appear
to be working properly until the moment at which it deviates from the protocol|but then
it may be too late. Heuristic predictions about the future behavior of a server are pointless
in security engineering. In consequence, the failure detector abstraction is not as useful
under a Byzantine (arbitrary failure) context as it is under a crash-failure context. This
opens two perspectives: either the failure detector is made to work properly in a malicious
fault environment, or a solution is devised that does not require failure detectors.
The rst solution is nothing else but following a programming model similar to
the one proposed for the timed approach. However, in this case, the payload system is
fully asynchronous, that is, time-free, and the time-based failure detector, in the TTCB,
is exclusively used to generate and control timeouts in a trusted way. Trusted should be
read both from the viewpoint that it is impossible to have accurate timeout-based failure
detectors in fully asynchronous systems [25], and from the viewpoint that with whatever
synchrony (even in partially synchronous systems) the former may be manipulated by a
malicious attacker, unless implemented in a tamper-proof environment.
For the second solution, we will rely on randomized (probabilistic) protocols, e.g.
Byzantine agreement. These protocols make essentially very few assumptions about the
environment (and in consequence, they also provide little guarantees, e.g. w.r.t. comple-
tion). Note however that the TTCB may still be used to strengthen some of the assump-
tions underlying this approach, in quest for more eÆcient implementations. For example,
for making the algorithms aware of the current synchrony of the system and temporarily
change operation mode, or for supplying basic security-related functions in a trusted way.
Despite the practical appeal of the asynchronous model, not much research has con-
centrated on developing eÆcient asynchronous protocols or implementing practical systems
that need consensus or Byzantine agreement [45]. Often, developers of practical systems
have avoided the approach because of the result of Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson [41], which
shows that consensus is not reachable by deterministic protocols, even with crash failures
only. But but there are randomized solutions that use only a constant expected number of
rounds to reach agreement [77, 12, 23]. Moreover, by employing modern, eÆcient crypto-
graphic techniques, this approach has recently been extended to a practical yet provably
secure protocol for Byzantine agreement in the cryptographic model that withstands the
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maximal possible corruption [18]. The fact that randomized agreement protocols may not
terminate with non-zero probability does not have to bother us because this probability is
negligible. Moreover, if a protocol uses authentication, digital signatures, or any cryptog-
raphy at all, and the practical protocols mentioned above do so, a negligible probability
of failure cannot be ruled out. Note that this failure probability is determined by the key
lengths, and therefore purely a function of the system design.
A variation of the asynchronous model is to assume probabilistic behavior of the
communication links [15, 68], where the probability that a link is broken permanently
decreases over time. This probability is a function of the system behavior. But since this
involves a timing assumption, it is essentially a probabilistic synchronous model (perhaps
it should also bear that name) and suers from some the problems mentioned before.
Another related model [68] assumes a fairness property and a partial order imposed by the
underlying communication system, but such assumptions seem also diÆcult to justify on
the Internet.
1.3 Topological Model
Previous work on large-scale open distributed systems has shown the value of topol-
ogy awareness in the construction of eÆcient protocols, from both functionality and per-
formance viewpoints [84]. The principle is explained very simply: (i) the topology of the
system is set up in ways that may enhance its properties; (ii) protocols and mechanisms
in general are designed in order to recognize system topology and take advantage from it.
This is achieved both by creating adequate physical topologies (the part of the
system under the control of the organization, e.g., the local networks) and by logically
reorganizing existing physical topologies (the part of the system outside the control of the
organization, e.g. the Internet).
We intend to extrapolate the virtues of topology awareness to security in the MAF-
TIA architecture, through a few principles for introducing topological constructs that facil-
itate the combined implementation of malicious fault tolerance and fault prevention. The
rst principle is to use topology to facilitate separation of concerns: the site-participant
separation in the internal structure of system hosts (or nodes| in the context of this
document, we will use these two designations interchangeably) separates communication
from processing; and the WAN-of-LANs duality at network level separates communication
amongst local aggregates of sites, which we call facilities, from long-haul communication
amongst facilities. The second principle is to use topology to construct clustering in a nat-
ural way. Two points of clustering seem natural in the MAFTIA large-scale architecture:
sites and facilities. These principles are illustrated in Figure 1.4.
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1.3.1 Sites and Participants
The MAFTIA architecture supports interactions among entities (e.g. processes,
tasks, etc.) in dierent hosts. We call them generically participants. Participants, which
execute distributed activities, can be senders or recipients of information, or both, in the
course of the aforementioned activities. The local topology of hosts is such that they are
divided into a site part, which connects to the network and takes care of all inter-host
operations, i.e., communication, and a participant part, which takes care of all distributed
activities and relies on the services provided by the site-part modules. Participants interact
via their respective site part, which handles all communication aspects on behalf of the
former, as represented in Figure 1.3.
From now on, we will refer to sites, when taking the communication/networking
viewpoint on the system, and we will refer to participants, when taking the activity/processing
viewpoint.
Site A
P
Py
P
P Px
P
P
Site B
Site C
COMMUNICATION
DISTRIBUTED PROCESSINGHost
Figure 1.3: Site-participant duality
A system built according to the site-participant duality model provides a framework
for dening realms of dierent synchrony, reliability and security. For example, intra-site
communication can be assumed to have better properties of synchrony and reliability with
regard to both accidental and malicious faults, in contrast with inter-site communication.
In consequence, while site failure detection is unreliable in a network of uncertain synchro-
nism, participant failures can be reliably detected. Likewise, dierent assumptions can be
made concerning trustworthiness of the participant and site parts.
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This distinction between sites and participants is in favor of { and can only be
achieved by { a communication subsystem approach for structuring the machine's net-
working. A site-level protocol server should take care of all send and receive activities on
behalf of the participants residing locally to it.
1.3.2 Two-tier WAN-of-LANS
The global topology of the networking infrastructure is seen as a logical two-tier
WAN-of-LANs. Large-scale computing infrastructures exhibit what appears to be a two-
tier organization: pools of sites with privately managed high connectivity links, such as
LANs or MANs or ATM fabrics, interconnected in the upper tier by a publicly managed
point-to-point global network (e.g., the Internet). More concretely, we mean that the global
network runs standard, de jure or de facto, protocols whilst each local network is run by a
single, private, entity, and can thus run specic protocols alongside standard protocols.
Again, this structure, depicted in Figure 1.4, oers opportunities for making dier-
ent assumptions regarding the types and levels of threat and degrees of vulnerability of the
local network versus the global network part. Incidentally, this does not necessarily mean
considering intra-facility networking threat-free. For example, certain port scans or pings
in the global network may mean absolutely nothing, whereas they may mean an attack if
performed inside the facility. On the other hand, an intruder working from the inside of
the facility may have considerably more power than one working from the outside. Note
that the rst hypothesis is in the direction of considering the facility as a more benign
environment, wheras the second is not.
1.3.3 Clustering
Clustering seems one of the most promising techniques to cope with large-scale dis-
tributed systems, providing the means to implement eective divide-and-conquer strategies.
Whilst this enhances scalability and performance, it also provides hooks for the combined
implementation of fault-tolerant mechanisms (e.g., cryptographic group management pro-
tocols) and fault-preventive protection strategies (e.g., rewalls). We identify at least two
clustering opportunities: (i) the Facility as a cluster of hosts, or more appropriately sites,
if seen from the viewpoint of the network; (ii) the Site as a cluster of participants, the ones
that reside in the relevant host, if we take the network viewpoint once again.
The rst clustering level is obviously compatible with the two-tier architecture iden-
tied in the previous section, and is illustrated in Figure 1.4. Clustering sites that coexist
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Figure 1.4: Two-tier WAN-of-LANs
in the same local network can simplify inter-network addressing, communication and ad-
ministration of these sites. Sites are hidden behind a single entry-point, a Facility Gateway,
a logical gateway that represents the local network members, for the global network.
The second level of clustering consists of taking advantage of a multiplying factor
between the number of sites and the (sometimes much larger) number of participants
that are actively engaged in distributed applications. Organization-dependent clustering
allows specic protocols to be run behind the Facility Gateways, without conicting with
the need to use standard protocols in wide-area networking, i.e. beyond those gateways.
Global network communication is then performed essentially among Facility Gateways.
From a security viewpoint, participant-site clustering allows investing in the imple-
mentation of fault-tolerant and fault-preventive mechanisms at site level, to collectively
serve the participant-level applications residing in the host. On the other hand, the oppor-
tunities oered by site-facility clustering with regard to security are manifold: rewalling at
the Facility Gateway; establishing inter-facility secure tunnels ending in the facility agents;
inspecting incoming and outgoing traÆc for attack and intrusion detection; ingress and
egress traÆc ltering; internal topology hiding through network address translation, etc.
1.3.4 Recursivity
The topological construct we have just presented can be recursively applied at
dierent levels, in order to represent very-large-scale organizations. On an intra-facility
level, further hierarchies, namely those already deriving from hierarchical organization of
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subnetworks and domains, are not precluded, if the Facility Gateway role is respected.
Protocols can easily take advantage of further topology renements.
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Figure 1.5: Virtual Private Networks in MAFTIA
At an intra-organization level, the topology depicted in Figure 1.4 can be instan-
tiated to represent an organization with multiple geographically dispersed facilities inter-
connected by secure tunnels whose end points are Facility Gateways. The only role of the
Facility Gateways in this special conguration is to implement the Virtual Private Network
(VPN) ensuring this internal communication, so they would be better named as Internal
Facility Gateways, as illustrated in Figure 1.5.
Finally, the organization still needs to be connected to the Internet, and contact
with other organizations. So, the topology in Figure 1.4 can represent the big picture|
inter-organization interactions| where each facility is so to speak the top-level facility,
the one containing the organization portal to the Internet. Communication with other
organizations through the Internet is ensured through normal gateways, let us call them
External Facility Gateways.
On an extra-organizational level, the Facility Gateway, which is a logical entity and
does not necessarily correspond to a single machine, oers the necessary services, such as
incoming email, web presence, e-commerce, and so forth, implemented by extranet-based
servers, serving potentially many thousands of clients.
1.4 Interaction Styles
In MAFTIA we intend to support dierent styles of basic interactions among the
participants. These interaction styles also assume topological importance, because they can
be combined to construct complex software architectures, but the possible combinations
are conditioned by the system topology.
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Although the main goal of MAFTIA is to provide security in the face of malicious
faults, the MAFTIA architecture must also provide a versatile functional support in order
to be useful. Consequentially, MAFTIA will support the main interaction styles used in
distributed computing, namely:
 client-server, for service invocations
 multipeer, for interactions amongst peers
 dissemination, of information in push or pull form
 transactions, for encapsulation of multiple actions
1.4.1 Client/Server
Client-server interactions can be implemented by two dierent mechanisms: in
closed loop, that is, in a blocking, request-conrmation manner, usually performed through
RPC [14]; or in open loop, that is, in an unblocking manner, usually performed through
group communication, pioneered by Cheriton [27], Birman [16] and Cristian [28], and fol-
lowed by many others. From previous works [17, 55], it is known to be diÆcult to scale
service access when clients need to be strongly coupled (for instance, when all messages
need to be ordered). However, there are a number of services, especially in large-scale
systems, where the coupling among clients, and between a client and the server, can be
weakened. In addition, techniques supporting reliable large-scale remote server access have
been deployed, allowing services to be easily replicated and invoked transparently, without
necessarily implying a degradation of strong failure semantics [82]. Both approaches are
easily implemented using group-based open-loop mechanisms.
1.4.2 Multipeer
Another style of interaction is multipeer, conveying the notion of spontaneous, sym-
metric interchange of information, amongst a collection of peer entities. This paradigm
appeared as early as in [75] where it is called multipoint association, and also in [71]
where it is called conversation, a term that we avoid in order not to cause confusion with
a dierent paradigm with the same name described in [19], and also discussed below.
Multipeer interactions are the kind of interaction one might wish among managers of a
distributed database, a group of commerce servers, a group of TTP servers, or a group of
participants running a cryptographic agreement (e.g., contract signing). Communication
27
requirements may be heavy in ordering and reliability requirements, and a notion of com-
position or membership may be required (for example, to provide explicit control over who
is currently in the group). Again, the highly interactive nature of the multipeer style of
interactions prevents per se the number of participants in real applications from exceeding
the small-scale threshold.
1.4.3 Dissemination
Dissemination is a style of interaction which combines the information push and
pull approaches. Information is published by publishers, and is made available on a repos-
itory. Message subscription can be implemented using two dierent alternatives: the push
strategy or the pull strategy. With the push strategy, subscribers just register their interest
in receiving a certain class of messages with the server, and the server is then responsible
for dissemination of these messages to the interested subscribers. With the pull strategy, it
is up to the subscriber to contact the server periodically to fetch the messages on request.
The number of recipients may be rather high, while the number of senders will not.
1.4.4 Transactions
Transactions are a style of interaction that allows the encapsulation of multiple ac-
tions. Transactions provide fault connement and simplify reasoning about the properties
of applications. Within the MAFTIA framework we will support two types of transactions:
atomic transactions, and coordinated atomic actions.
The well-known atomic transactions [61] style of interaction allows the grouping
of a set of operations into a single higher level action that either completes successfully
or has its eects undone. Additionally transactions guarantee the properties of atomicity,
consistency, isolation and durability (ACID). Atomicity is the property that the transaction
either completes and its eects on resources are made permanent (committed) or the
eects are undone (aborted). This is achieved either through backward recovery where no
application-specic knowledge is needed or forward recovery where an application-specic
protocol is used to leave the resources in a consistent state. Transactions ensure that
all changes to the state of resources are consistent irrespective of concurrent access and
failures. Each transaction is isolated from another, they cannot access shared resources
at the same time. Finally, the durability property means that results of a committed
transaction will survive the crash of the nodes involved in the transaction. This requires
that all committed state changes are written to some crash-proof storage.
28
The Coordinated atomic actions (or CA actions) style of interaction [106][107] ex-
tends transactions and is a mechanism for coordinating multi-threaded interactions and
ensuring consistent access to objects in the presence of concurrency and potential faults.
It can be regarded as providing a framework for nested multi-participant interactions that
in addition provides very general exception handling facilities. CA actions will allow the
building of advanced applications that rely upon multi-participant interactions. Also, CA
actions potentially could be used as a structuring mechanism for error containment since
an action provides a structural boundary that keeps information and events under control.
The CA action mechanism's exception handling facilities allow both application-level faults
and reported unmasked low-level faults to be tolerated. These features makes CA actions
a good candidate for a structuring mechanism for building intrusion-tolerant components.
1.5 Group Models
The concept of group appears intuitively when describing many distributed actions[97].
The most striking examples can be found in the Computer Supported Collaborative Work
(CSCW) arena, where applications are supposed to support the interaction among groups
of end-users (e.g., distributed document processing, concurrent engineering), and its more
recent instantiations on the Internet (e.g., desktop conferencing, virtual enterprises, mar-
ketplaces). Often, groups appear in a less evident but nonetheless useful way, when repli-
cation is involved. Examples of relevant problem specications are: copies of a table in a
group of sites in a network, for performance reasons; a group of replicas, for fault-tolerance
reasons.
The group abstraction ts naturally into the MAFTIA architecture system model.
Participants that trust each other, cooperating on a given task, should be included in the
same high-level group. At the low level, to support secure communication, the sites contain-
ing participants could form another group. This low-level group would use cryptography
and authentication mechanisms, to prevent adversaries from eavesdropping or corrupting
the communication. The use of several groups with dierent service guarantees, and its
composition thereof, in the construction of complex applications, can be explored taking
into account the topological structure of the network. For example, we could have a hierar-
chy of groups, whose top level exists at the global network, with its members representing
groups inside the local facilities. Higher levels of the hierarchy would have stronger secu-
rity requirements (e.g., cryptography keys with more bits). Some of the interaction styles
that MAFTIA wants to support are also closely related to the idea of groups, for instance,
multippeer and dissemination.
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1.5.1 Open vs. Closed Groups
Group communication systems can be divided into two categories depending on
who can send messages to the group. Systems that support a closed model only allow
members of the group to send messages to the group. Outside participants that want to
interact with the members of the group, either have to join the group before they start
to communicate, or they have to send messages (point-to-point) to each member of the
group. On the other hand, systems with the open model do not impose any restrictions on
the senders. Any participant that knows the identier of the group can send messages to
its members.
From a security point of view, it is much easier to support the closed group model.
The group can be considered an island of trust, where all messages are encrypted using,
for instance, a group key that is known to all members. Exterior messages can be immedi-
ately disregarded, without the necessity of authenticating each message from every sender,
because they were not generated using the shared keys. The use of a closed group model
imposes, however, some limitations on the construction of the applications. For example,
if we want want to build a replicated server, clients (which are usually non-members) must
be able to send requests to the group. On this model, there are basically two solutions to
this problem: either the client is required to join the group, or one of the servers is selected
to receive the requests and then is responsible to send them to the other members. In
both cases there is a performance penalty that must be paid. The rst solution requires an
update on the group membership, and the second the transmission of an extra message.
In an open group, the properties of security (e.g., condentiality and integrity) can
be ensured on the communication among the members using mechanisms similar to the
ones used in closed groups. External communication, however, will be more complicated
because at least for some applications it will be necessary to authenticate the messages.
For example, on a music repository there might be a charge for each MP3 le that is
downloaded, which means all clients requests need to be reliably authenticated. The au-
thentication per se, can be done by dierent components of the architecture, by the group
communication system or by the application. Nevertheless, external communication ex-
poses the group to a higher level of threat because there are more types of attacks that
can be explored by the adversary, for instance, denial of service attacks.
In the MAFTIA architecture we intend to use an extension of the previous models,
which distinguishes between several types of participants [84]:
 Remote clients - can only send messages to the group
 Senders - have to explicitly attach themselves to the group, and they can exclusively
send messages to the group
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 Members - can only receive messages from the group (and they have necessarily to
attach themselves to the group)
This model gives a reasonable amount of exibility to the participants in their inter-
actions with the group. For instance, only members, that is, the recipients, incur the cost of
maintaining the necessary structures and state to ensure the desired message delivery QoS.
On the other hand, a participant that wants bidirectional access becomes both a sender
and a member. Other participants might only want to send messages occasionally, and
in this case they stay as remote clients. The separation in dierent types of participants
is important both in terms of security and performance. Participants that are senders
or members have to do a time consuming authentication only once, when they join the
group. On the other hand, remote clients have to be authenticated every time they send a
message.
1.5.2 Static vs. Dynamic Groups
Groups are classied as dynamic or static depending on whether it is possible or
not to change the composition of the group. Dynamic groups allow updates to the current
membership of the group, either by removing the members that are perceived as faulty,
or by letting new sites join the group. Static groups keep the same members during the
whole lifetime of the system, despite observable corruptions.
It is usually easier to support static groups in a secure manner because cryptographic
parameters or keys only have to be distributed once, during the system setup. For example,
threshold-cryptography protocols are based on a xed set of parameters (e.g., n and t) that
must be known during initialization, when the key shares are generated. From this moment,
these parameters remain constant. While the system is executing, however, an adversary
might be able to corrupt one of the sites and learn all the secrets that are kept there. For
certain types of applications this might be a serious problem, but for others, for instance
applications based on the state-machine replication, no real damage is done as long as the
number of faulty sites is smaller than 1/3 of the total number of sites.
For state-machine replication it would be interesting if one could restart periodically
the sites with uncorrupted copies of the state and redistribute fresh keys. If this could be
done in a secure manner the evil eects introduced by the adversary would be removed.
This solution, however, might be diÆcult to implement unless systems are constructed in
a careful way. Normally, an adversary will penetrate a machine not because he or she
was able to break the cryptographic algorithms, but because there was a vulnerability
that could be exploited. This creates the problem that unless the vulnerability is removed
during the refresh, the adversary will be able to regain control of the site. Moreover, if
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the same vulnerability is present in other machines, it will be relatively easy and fast to
corrupt more than 1/3 of the replicas.
Dynamic groups allow an alternative solution where faulty sites are simply removed
from the system. In this model, at any instant of time, there is a view that represents the
sites that are currently active members of the group. If for some reason the membership
has to be changed, then a new view is installed, and new keys are distributed. Dynamically
changing the keys, however, is a hard problem if we consider that a corrupted a site might
be involved in the view change, because the detection of the intrusion was not done.
Nevertheless, this model is much more practical than static groups because real systems
are usually long-running, and they grow or shrink as time goes by.
In the MAFTIA architecture we intend to separate the concepts of membership and
view. The membership is the set of sites that are members of the group. This set is not
static, and can evolve as new sites want to join the group, or others want to leave. The
view is always a subset of the membership. It contains all the members that are currently
active in the group. If a site fails for some reason, the membership continues to be the
same, but the view has to be updated with the removal of the site. This separation between
membership and view is important in terms of fault-tolerance systems because it facilitates
the group management when there are failures/recoveries or network partitions/rejoins. In
terms of security it is still an open problem.
1.5.3 Inclusion and Exclusion of Members
If one adopts dynamic groups, there are protocols needed for including and exclud-
ing parties to a group. Unless there are cryptographic secrets shared among a group, this
seems not to pose any diÆculties. But since the groups in a security context must oper-
ate primarily through cryptographic operations, and most practical agreement protocols
involve cryptography, care must be taken here.
When a party is excluded from a group because it had been corrupted by an intruder,
one must assume that all information known to this party is now also known to the intruder.
In the context of threshold cryptography, where each party holds a share of a public key, this
party must now be considered corrupted forever. To prevent this undesirable eect, there
have been protocols designed for periodically refreshing the key shares held by all parties
such that this knowledge becomes useless to the adversary. So-called proactively secure
cryptosystems [22] can tolerate that all parties are corrupted during the whole lifetime of
the system, as long there is always an honest majority between any two resharing steps.
They work essentially in synchronous networks with broadcast channels available, and must
be adopted for an Internet setting.
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When a new party joins a group, it must receive the secret keys pertaining to the
group, possibly including shares of threshold cryptosystems. The same issues as for key
generation and key management (Section 2.3) arise here as well: either there is a trusted
dealer that can distribute the keys (but this is a single point of failure) or a distributed
protocol is invoked to produce them (which might be ineÆcient).
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Consider the generic services commonly found in distributed systems:
 Name Service { supplies the global names and addresses of users, services and re-
sources
 Networking Service { provides access by users and programs to the basic networking
and communication facilities (e.g. sockets over TCP/IP on LAN, dial-up, Internet)
 Remote Invocation Service { provides for remote operation client-server invocation
 Time Service { supplies and keeps synchronized a global time reference, normally
made of local clocks
 File and Archive Service { provides the abstraction of a unique le system, globally
accessible, made of distributed repositories
 Brokerage Service { performs trading and binding of services and users in a hetero-
geneous environment (e.g., Object Request Broker)
 Registration, Authentication and Authorization Services { Registers users and ser-
vices, performs runtime authentication of users and control of their access to services
and resources
 Administration Service { performs tactical management tasks, in order to manage
users and keep the system resources and services operating correctly
Observing these services, we conclude that some of them are standard, and more
secure versions of these standards exist today, such as the name service, and the basic
protocols of networking, time and remote invocation services in Internet settings. File and
archive, and brokerage services have been the subject of a great deal of work focused on
improving the security of such subsystems, which can be reused. However, other services
are extremely sensitive, and their resilience may make the dierence in a secure and fault-
tolerant system.
Registration, authentication and authorization services lie at the core of the security
of any distributed system. As such, they deserve particular attention in MAFTIA. Namely,
specic Authorization and Trusted Third Party services will be developed in the project.
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Finally, the administration services are essential to keep the system operating correctly.
Many solutions to the general administration problem exist. However, it is felt that research
is still worthwhile in security administration, and the project is specically addressing the
problem of developing an Intrusion Detection service.
Finally, as in other areas, it is felt that the development of complex distributed ap-
plications should benet from, if not require, support middleware, in the form of libraries,
functions, or protocols, which assist their construction and correct execution. The MAF-
TIA middleware is oriented to support the main paradigm investigated in MAFTIA, and
thus provide a set of those functions and protocols enabling the construction of intrusion-
tolerant applications and services. These middleware components should be modular, and
able to be used recursively to construct more complex components. That should apply
both to MAFTIA services like the ones just mentioned, and to end-user applications.
Both these objectives and the discussions of the previous sections have guided the
denition of the MAFTIA middleware architecture that we present next.
2.1 System Components
The architecture of a MAFTIA host is represented in Figure 2.1, in which the local
topology and the dependence relations between modules are depicted by the orientation
of the (\depends-on") arrows. This architecture is orthogonal to the TTCB so that every
module can use the services of that component. In Figure 2.1 the set of layers is divided into
site and participant levels. The site level has access to and depends on a physical networking
infrastructure, not represented for simplicity. The participant level oers support to local
participants engaging in distributed computations. The lowest layer is the Multipoint
Network module, MN, created over the physical infrastructure. Its main properties are the
provision of multipoint addressing and a moderate best-eort error recovery ability, both
depending on topology and site liveness information, and basic inter-site secure channels
and message envelopes. The MN layer hides the particulars of the underlying network to
which a given site is directly attached, and is as thin as the intrinsic properties of the latter
allow.
In the site level, the Site Failure Detector module, SF, is in charge of assessing the
connectivity and correctness of sites, and the MN module depends on this information. Site
failure detection of sites with a local TTCB is reliable because the TTCB is synchronous
and secure. For sites without a local TTCB, the SF module depends on the network
to perform its job and thus is not completely reliable, due to the uncertain synchrony
and susceptibility to attacks of at least parts of the network. The universe of sites being
monitored can be parameterized, for example: all sites inside a facility, all sites having to
do with ongoing computations at this site, all facility agents, etc. The Site Membership
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Figure 2.1: Architecture of a MAFTIA Host
module, SM, depends on information given by the SF module. It creates and modies the
membership (registered members) and the view (currently active, or non-failed, or trusted
members) of sets of sites, which we call site-groups. The Communication Support Services
module, CS, implements cryptographic group communication primitives such as Byzantine
agreement and group communication with several reliability and ordering guarantees, clock
synchronization, and other core services. The CS module depends on information given
by the SM module about the composition of the groups, and on the MN module to access
the network.
In the participant level, the Participant Failure Detector module, PF, assesses the
liveness and correctness of all local participants, based on local information provided by
sensors in the operating system support. The Participant Membership module, PM, per-
forms similar operations as the SM, on the membership and view of participant groups. The
PM module monitors all groups with local members, depending on information propagated
by the SM and by the PF modules, and operating cooperatively with the corresponding
modules in the concerned remote sites. The Activity Support Services module, AS, im-
plements building blocks that assist participant activity, such as replication management,
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participant group key management, transactional management, and so forth. Note that
several participant groups, or simply groups, may exist in a single site. The site-participant
clustering and separation of concerns stated earlier is thus implemented by making a sep-
aration between groups of participants (performing distributed activities), and site-groups
of the sites where those participants reside (performing reliable communication on behalf
of the latter). Clustering can be further enhanced by mapping more than one group onto
the same site-group, in what are called lightweight groups [81]. It depends on the services
provided by the CS module, and on the membership information provided by the PM
module.
Consequentially, the protocols implementing the layers described above all share
the topology awareness property. As such, they may run dierently depending on their po-
sition in the topology, although this happens transparently. For example, the SF protocol
instantiated at the Facility Gateways may wish to aggregate all liveness/failure information
from the site it oversees, and gather that same information from the corresponding remote
Facility Gateways. These considerations may obviously be extended to topology-aware
attack and intrusion detection. In conclusion, in MAFTIA we intend to support dierent
styles of basic interactions among the participants, namely: client-server, for service invo-
cations; multipeer, for interactions amongst peers; dissemination, of information in push
or pull form; transactions, for encapsulation of multiple actions. The middleware platform
provides several services at dierent levels of abstraction, which contribute to support
the above-mentioned interaction styles. At the Communication Services level: basic dis-
tributed cryptography, random number and key generation; byzantine agreement; ordered
and reliable multicast and their cryptographic variants; time and clock synchronization;
etc. Likewise, Activity Services are those concerning the direct support of distributed
applications, and from the several possible classes of building blocks supported by the
MAFTIA middleware, we currently envision: distributed and replicated state machine
support; distributed transaction support; participant key management.
2.2 Site Level
2.2.1 Multipoint Network
Seen from the network, an instantiation of the MAFTIA middleware runs over what
we call a Domain, which is the set of sites, spread over the global network, on which any of
the distributed applications in question will run. This concept is necessary in order to keep
track of all the sites that compose a \MAFTIA system", amongst the immense collection
of hosts of the Internet.
Sites are administratively registered in the Domain, which is a at concept, although
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the hierarchy and clustering principles of MAFTIA may be used to make the handling
and addressing of sites more eÆcient. Each local Site Failure Detector has a view of
the currently reachable and correct sites in the Domain, the Domain View , C
sp
. The
view is updated by the failure detection protocols. The Domain may obviously be very
large, depending on the scale of the applications. In consequence, the scope of inter-site
communication for failure detection may be subdivided using the Facility-based hierarchy:
the SF modules of Facility Gateways perform direct intra-facility failure detection, and
share failure information with peer Facility Gateway SFs. This topology awareness suits
the protocol functionality, but is kept transparent to its semantics.
Multipoint Addressing
The Multipoint Network presents two classes of interfaces: LocalNet and GlobalNet .
The GlobalNet is the inter-Facility communication interface and the LocalNet is the intra-
Facility communication interface. In order to preserve the maximum generality possible,
the hierarchical nature of our network model is only made visible when necessary, for
example when important performance or security gains can be achieved. This will be
exemplied later in this section, when discussing topology-aware services. Transparency is
achieved by the logical addressing structure. MAFTIA middleware is built on top of current
network architectures, for example, but not limited to: bridged Ethernet for the LocalNet;
the Internet for the GlobalNet. The LocalNet and GlobalNet protocols are implemented on
top of the relevant standard protocol drivers (IP, UDP, etc.), and traÆc is routed to/from
either by a dispatcher. A possible implementation of GlobalNet addressing is through an
internet group address such as multicast-IP, addressing all the Facility Gateways holding
addressed sites. A possible implementation of LocalNet addressing is through a physical
group address such as Ethernet multicast.
A logical address A represents a set of addressee sites S. The meaning of the logical
address depends on the place where it is handled:
 in a Facility - all sites of S in this Facility, plus the Facility Gateway, are addressed; a
possible implementation of A is through a physical group address A
L
(e.g., Ethernet
multicast address);
 in the Global Network - all Facility Gateways of Facilities holding sites belonging to
S are addressed; a possible implementation of A is through an internet group address
A
G
(e.g., multicast-IP) addressing all the Facility Gateways holding sites in S;
 at a Facility Gateway - a message arriving at a Facility Gateway, coming from the
Global Network, with address A, is retransmitted to the Facility, to address A (a
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possible implementation is having A
G
translated into A
L
); a message arriving at a
Facility Gateway, coming from the Facility, with address A, is retransmitted to the
Global Network, to address A (a possible implementation is having A
L
translated
into A
G
).
The functionality of a Multipoint Network module is exemplied in [42], although
that work considers a benign failure model. The following functionality was provided:
 GlobalNet - logical addressing (translates to multiple point-to-point routes); FIFO or
unordered communication; reliability at this level is just best-eort-1, k-retry, that
is, a transmission is tried up to k + 1 times, in a best eort to ensure that at least
one recipient gets it; rate-based ow control; dynamic rerouting for partition healing;
datagram fragmentation to the minimum MTU of inter-Facility routes.
 LocalNet - logical addressing (translates to physical multicast); reliability is datagram
(no check); rate-based ow control.
Best-eort Delivery
The Multipoint Network abstraction provides a best-eort communication seman-
tics, i.e., the service provided by this module is a best-eort delivery of messages. The
reliability of delivery can be improved only by simple algorithms such as retries. Reliable
delivery, causal order, total order, and other communication semantics are handled by the
Communication Support module (see the following section).
Routing
Routing is a standard function of Internet protocols. Routing is updated whenever
link or router failures occur. However, this is not a very prompt and dynamic function in
the current Internet. This has eects on system availability when accidental failures occur,
and the former will most certainly be amplied if those failures are caused intentionally,
i.e. through denial of service attacks.
Inasmuch as eectiveness of distributed system operation has been enhanced with
failure detectors, this information can also be used to improve the operation of Internet
routing protocols, provided that it does undermine their standard nature. We follow that
approach in MAFTIA, namely in what regards quick reaction to partitioning.
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Partitioning occurs when a network is split such that sites cannot continue to enjoy
the symmetry, transitivity and connectivity properties. Telling network partitioning from
site failure is useful, because the system support can do things in order to repair the
problem, or avoid a premature declaration of failure of the out-partition sites:
 the simplest is for the Site Failure Detector (SF ) to wait, during a given timeout,
for a possible merge, instead of immediately declaring failure of the aected sites.
This has the virtue of preventing the application from reconguring twice (back and
forth) when the partition occurs for a short period of time.
 more sophisticated, but quite eective, is partition healing. Besides preventing pre-
mature failure declaration as well, it also attempts at removing the physical symptoms
of partition.
For a site S
v
, a site S
p
is partitioned if at least one of the following predicates hold:
 Non-transitive Partition - there is a site S
m
, such that: S
v
is alive for S
m
, and S
p
is
alive for S
m
, and S
p
is failed for S
v
 Non-symmetrical Partition - S
p
is failed for S
v
, and S
v
is alive for S
p
 Total Partition - there is a partition P
out
, to which S
p
belongs, and there is a partition
P
in
, to which S
v
belongs, such that: all sites in P
out
are failed for all sites in P
in
, and
all sites in P
in
are alive for all sites in P
in
A non-transitive partition can cause an undesirable membership instability if not
handled properly.
The above notion of partition can be extended to several sets of partitions. When
the SF has additional information on the state of the network, provided by the MN for
example, it may be possible to correlate failure of Global Network links to the defaulting
route, in case of partial partition, or to the composition of P
out
, in the case of total partition.
This is not only possible but straightforward to implement in the Internet. Whilst IPv6
is bound to improve routing responsiveness, connectivity glitches may last longer than
expected, for example due to the load queues that build up[54].
As an example of how modules of the architecture can use the run-time environment,
the SF can use TTCB services to help improve the assessment of a problem, namely to
determine whether it is a partition or a site failure, as it can reliable detect the failure of
sites by detecting failure of the local TTCB.
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Partition healing is attempted whenever the symptoms indicate partitioning. Rerout-
ing of traÆc for the partitioned sites is attempted, by resorting to the help of \friendly"
sites in the domain.
Partitions are sometimes due to temporary ickering of the network, and thus short-
lived. However, most of the times, they result from failure of a link, in a situation where
there are alternate paths. However, for several reasons, routing in most global network
settings, such as the Internet, is rather static, and not bound to change on account of
these occurrences. However, the situation tends to change, namely in the forthcoming new
Internet protocols. As such, the partition healing facility that we provide is modular and
can be disabled if and when standard protocols handle partitioning better. It is performed
by the Multipoint Network (MN) protocols running over IP, under the control of the SF .
Let us dene S
v
, the local site, P
out
, the out-partition (that is, the set of sites which
S
v
cannot communicate directly with), and P
med
, the mediating sites, which can commu-
nicate with both S
v
and sites in P
out
. For example, imagine that di.fc.ul.pt , in Portugal
( S
v
), is cut o from cornell.edu, in the U.S.A. (belonging P
out
), but newcastle.ac.uk , in
the U.K., (belonging to P
med
, the mediator set), communicates both with di.fc.ul.pt and
cornell.edu.
The idea is very simple. The SF , upon deciding `partial-partition' failure, does not
inform the SM module, as would be normal. Instead, it makes a call to the MN module
asking to reroute all communication from S
v
addressed to site S
p
in P
out
, through site S
m
in P
med
. When the partition disappears, the SF module instructs the MN to go back to
the old route. However, this only occurs some time after rerouting. This very simple form
of hysteresis is used to avoid routing instability.
A nal issue is the interaction of partition healing and rewalls. It was made clear
that partition healing is made with rerouting traÆc during a partition lifetime. Firewalls
can be used, e.g., to protect a Facility, and may impede traÆc to go in or out through a
new route, as that traÆc can be considered to be potentially malicious. Several solutions
to this problem exist. The easier is to remove the rewall rules that avoid that rerouting
to work. However, that is usually undesirable or the rules would not be there in the rst
place.
Another solution is to allow the component that wants to reroute traÆc to change
these rules in run-time. However, to allow something to dynamically change rewall rules
is dangerous because a hacker can use the same functionality to recongure the rewall at
his will. Denial-of-service attacks can be especially easy. Even though, this scheme can be
used with caution:
 The components that will be allowed to change the rewall rules have to be clearly
identied. If only partitions in the Global Network are handled, only the Facility
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Gateway will run partition healing protocols and so only this component will need
to interact with the rewall(s).
 It cannot be possible to change all rules, but only those pertaining to MAFTIA
middleware traÆc between the specic Facilities.
 Communication between the component and the rewall has to be secured: mu-
tual authentication has to occur; authenticity (also against message playback) and
integrity of messages has to be guaranteed.
Basic Secure Channels and Envelopes
The MN module provides basic secure channels and message envelopes to protect
communication between sites. Secure channels are used to protect communication that
lasts long enough for the concept of connection to make sense. They are based on shared
symmetric keys that are used to authenticate messages, symmetric cryptography is faster
than asymmetric. These cryptographic signatures are used to protect the integrity of
communication against forgery, modication, replay, reorder and suppression of messages.
Messages can also be encrypted in order to guarantee their condentiality. In general keys
to protect the integrity should be dierent from keys to protect condentiality of messages.
The reason for this is that the integrity of messages stops being a problem a short time
after their delivery while condentiality of data needs, in general, to be kept for a long
time after message delivery. The precise meaning of this \short time" and \long time"
expressions depends respectively on the communication system and on the application.
As another example of how the TTCB run-time services can be used by middle-
ware modules, note that the shared keys can be established with the help of the TTCB
authentication and key establishment services. This support can be combined with the
use of a fully edged Key Distribution Center or agreed upon using a key agreement pro-
tocol [6, 5]. These two solutions require the site to have a long-term asymmetric key pair
for authentication. The TTCB has such a key pair, and it is able to store it with a high
degree of security, by denition of TTCB. Again, this support can be combined with the
use of a fully edged Certication Authority, for provision of new key certicates to newly
instantiated MAFTIA host TTCBs, revocation of the same key certicates, renewal, and
so forth.
Secure envelopes are used for sporadic transmissions, and seek to achieve site-level
transmission security. They resort to per-message security and may use a combination of
symmetric and asymmetric cryptography as a form of improving performance, especially
for messages with large bodies. With the current state of the art, they can mostly be
implemented through the IP security extensions (IPSec)[52].
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2.2.2 Communication Support
This section discusses fault-tolerant communication protocols. We focus on proto-
cols subject to arbitrary (Byzantine) faults, such as those resulting from malicious attacks
and intrusions.
Most secure protocols rely on cryptographic techniques, so we introduce rst a set
of distributed cryptography building blocks that will be available. Protocols for reaching
Byzantine agreement are another important building block. We then describe fault-tolerant
broadcast protocols for group communication with various semantics. They guarantee the
safety properties needed for realizing fault-tolerant applications using the state-machine
replication paradigm.
Distributed Cryptography
Cryptographic techniques, such as public-key encryption schemes and digital signa-
tures [64], are crucial already for many existing secure services. For distributing trusted
services, we also need distributed variants of them from threshold cryptography [33].
Threshold cryptographic schemes are non-trivial extensions of the classical concept
of secret sharing in cryptography: this allows a group of n parties to share a secret such
that t or fewer of them have no information about it, but t + 1 or more can uniquely
reconstruct it. However, one cannot simply share the secret key of a cryptosystem and
reconstruct it for decrypting a message because as soon as a single corrupted party knows
the key, the cryptosystem becomes completely insecure and unusable.
A threshold public-key cryptosystem looks much like an ordinary public-key cryp-
tosystem with distributed decryption. There is a single public key for encryption, but each
party holds a key share for decryption (all keys were generated by a trusted dealer). A
party may process a decryption request for a particular ciphertext and output a decryption
share together with a proof of its validity. Given a ciphertext resulting from encrypting
some message and more than t valid decryption shares for that ciphertext, it is easy to
recover the message; this property is called robustness. The scheme must also be secure
against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks in order to be useful for all conceivable applica-
tions (see [90] for background information). The formal security denition can be found in
the literature [92]; essentially, it ensures that the adversary cannot obtain any meaningful
information from a ciphertext unless she has obtained a corresponding decryption share
from at least one honest party.
In a threshold signature scheme, each party holds a share of the secret signing key
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and may generate shares of signatures on individual messages upon request. The validity
of a signature share can be veried for each party. From t + 1 valid signature shares,
one can generate a digital signature on the message that can later be veried using the
single, publicly known signature verication key. In a robust and secure threshold signature
scheme, it is infeasible for a computationally bounded adversary (1) to produce t+1 valid
signature shares that cannot be combined to a valid signature, and (2) to output a valid
signature on a message for which no honest party generated a signature share.
Another important cryptographic primitive is a threshold coin-tossing scheme, as
used by the randomized Byzantine agreement protocols. It provides arbitrarily many
unpredictable random bits that can be accessed in arbitrary order. Intuitively, one may
imagine that a coin-tossing scheme maps an arbitrary bit string|the name of a coin|to
a random bit, which is unpredictable before not some honest parties reveal corresponding
information. We have developed the rst practical cryptographic scheme for coin-tossing
recently; its security is based on the DiÆe-Hellman problem [18]. It will be used for
MAFTIA agreement protocols.
A major complication for adopting threshold cryptography to our partially syn-
chronous system is that many early protocols are not robust and that most protocols
rely heavily on synchronous broadcast channels [33]. Only very recently, non-interactive
schemes have been developed that satisfy the appropriate notions of security, like the
threshold cryptosystem of Shoup and Gennaro [92] and the threshold signature scheme
of Shoup [91]. Both have non-interactive variants that integrate well into asynchronous
settings, which we also intend to support. However, they can be proved secure only in the
so-called random oracle model that makes an idealizing assumption about cryptographic
hash functions [10]. This falls short from a proof in the real world but gives very strong
heuristic evidence for their security; there are many practical cryptographic algorithms
with proofs only in this model.
Byzantine Agreement
Byzantine agreement requires all parties to agree on a binary value that was pro-
posed by an honest party. The protocol of Cachin et al. [18] follows the basic structure of
all randomized solutions (e.g., [11]) and guarantees termination within a constant expected
number of asynchronous rounds, except with negligibly small probability. It achieves the
optimal resilience n > 3t by using a robust threshold coin-tossing protocol, whose security
is based on the so-called DiÆe-Hellman problem. It requires a trusted dealer for setup,
but can process an arbitrary number of independent agreements afterwards. Threshold
signatures are further employed to decrease all messages to a constant size. As mentioned
before, its security proof relies on the random oracle model.
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A useful primitive is also multi-valued Byzantine agreement, which provides agree-
ment on values from larger domains. Multi-valued agreement requires a non-trivial ex-
tension of the binary Byzantine agreement protocols mentioned above. The diÆculty in
multi-valued Byzantine agreement is how to ensure the \validity" of the resulting value.
One approach to this is an \external validity" condition, using a predicate with which
every honest party can determine the validity of a proposed value. The protocol must then
guarantee that the system may only decide for a value if it is acceptable to honest parties.
Group Communication
Simulating the abstraction of a broadcast channel on top of a network of point-to-
point channels with process failures is a diÆcult task. For systems where parties (processes)
can crash, the problem is quite well understood today, after a considerable research eort
was made during the last 20 years. It has led to a set of established notions and protocols
for reliable broadcast with FIFO, causal, and total ordering properties. We refer to the
survey of Hadzilacos and Toueg [46] for a comprehensive treatment of this area.
For systems with malicious faults, though, there are still several open problems in
terms of denitions as well as protocols. The investigation of these problems is one of the
goals of MAFTIA.
A basic broadcast protocol in a distributed system with failures is reliable broadcast,
which provides a way for a party to send a message to all other parties. Its specication
requires that all honest parties deliver the same set of messages and that this set includes
all messages broadcast by honest parties. However, it makes no assumptions if the sender
of a message is corrupted and does not guarantee anything about the order in which
messages are delivered. The basic reliable broadcast protocol of our architecture is an
optimized variant of the elegant protocol by Bracha and Toueg [15]. A variation of it,
called consistent broadcast, is also foreseen, since it is advantageous in certain situations.
It guarantees uniqueness of the delivered message (thus the name consistent broadcast),
but relaxes the requirement that all honest parties actually deliver the message|a party
may still learn about the existence of the message by other means and ask for it. A similar
protocol has also been used by Reiter [78].
An atomic broadcast guarantees a total order on messages such that honest parties
deliver all messages in the same order. Any implementation of it must implicitly reach
agreement whether or not to deliver a message sent by a corrupted party and, intuitively,
this is where Byzantine agreement is needed. The basic structure of the atomic broadcast
protocol follows the atomic broadcast protocol of Chandra and Toueg [25] for the crash-
failure model: The parties proceed in global rounds and agree on a set of messages to
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deliver at the end of each round.
At the beginning of a round, each party proposes to deliver the messages it knows
using a variation of reliable broadcast. Multi-valued Byzantine agreement is then used to
determine a party who has correctly broadcast a valid proposal. All messages contained
in the selected proposal are delivered according to a xed order. This atomic broadcast
protocol guarantees liveness, i.e., a message broadcast by an honest party cannot be delayed
arbitrarily by the adversary once it is known to at least t+ 1 parties.
Atomic broadcast and multicast protocols (also known as total order) have proved
to be extremely useful in supporting many fault-tolerant distributed applications. For
instance, total delivery order is a requirement for the implementation of replicated state-
machines [86], which is a general paradigm for implementing fault-tolerant distributed ap-
plications.
Although several protocols have been described in the literature [4, 16, 13, 26, 36, 50,
51, 55, 62, 63, 71], few were specically targeted to operate in (geographically) large-scale
systems. In a large scale network processes' traÆc patterns are usually heterogeneous. The
same applies to the network links: some processes will be located within the same local
area network whereas others will be connected through slow links, and thus subject to
long delays. In such an environment, none of the previous approaches can provide optimal
performance.
The topology-aware total order protocol recognizes that some ordering mechanisms
are more appropriate for local-area networks and other more suitable for the wide area
network. Since we are targeting a WAN-of-LANs network model, we have designed an
hybrid scheme, where each process is able to operate with the ordering mechanism that
is most suitable given its position with regard to its peers in the network topology. If all
processes are in the same cluster (single or set of interconnected LANs), one mechanism is
used. If all processes are in dierent clusters, another mechanism is used. In intermediate
scenarios, dierent mechanisms are integrated in a hybrid protocol [80].
A secure causal atomic broadcast is an atomic broadcast that also ensures a causal
order among all broadcast messages, as put forward by Reiter and Birman [79]. Causal
communication enforces a logical precedence between messages [16]: Logical precedence in
a distributed system, in which information is exchanged only by transmitting messages, a
messagem is said to precede or to be potentially causally related to a message n, represented
as m ! n, only if: (i) m and n were sent by the same process and n was sent after m
or; (ii) m has been delivered to the emitter of n before n was sent or; (iii) there exists x
such that m ! x and x ! n. With arbitrary faults causality can already be violated by
any process that merely observes a message, say during an agreement protocol. Protecting
agains this requires encryption.
46
Experience has shown [85, 16, 71, 96] that the design of distributed applications
can be simplied if messages are received in order of logical precedence. Since extra com-
plexity would be added to such applications, should the communication subsystem not
provide causal delivery, several algorithms have been proposed to implement this ordering
discipline [56, 88, 16, 40, 71, 55]. Nevertheless, despite its advantages, the use of causal
communication has been somehow limited by the overhead incurred by existing implemen-
tations. A major cost of protocols that preserve logical precedence is the size of \history"
information that needs to be stored and exchanged to maintain causality, specially in
large-scale systems where group addressing is used.
A topology-aware approach can benet from the WAN-of-LANs model, allowing to
extend previous results on causal history compression using knowledge on the topology of
the communication structure. A compression technique based on the concept of a causal
separator, a set of nodes of the communication graph that can be used to lter causal
information is presented in [83].
A secure causal atomic broadcast can be implemented by combining an atomic
broadcast protocol that tolerates a Byzantine adversary with a robust threshold cryp-
tosystem. Encryption ensures that messages remain secret up to the moment at which
they are guaranteed to be delivered. Thus, client requests to a trusted service using this
broadcast remain condential until they are scheduled and answered by the service. The
threshold cryptosystem must be secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks to pre-
vent the adversary from submitting any related message for delivery, which would violate
causality in our context. Maintaining causality is crucial in the asynchronous environment
for replicating services that involve condential data.
Time and Clock Synchronisation
In order to implement synchronous and partially synchronous protocols, we need
time and clock synchronization primitives for those hosts with no local TTCB is available.
Several clock synchronization protocols are well established today [105, 53, 93]. However,
most if not all of them assume only benign faults.
The MAFTIA model suggests to use topology-aware clock synchronization, which
can exploit the WAN-of-LANs network model and also tolerates malicious faults. More
precisely:
 At the LAN level, a protocol tailored to local area networks is used. The protocol
fully exploits the intrinsic attributes of these networks: error rate is low, transmission
delay is bounded but with high variance, median transmission delay is close to the
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minimum, and message reception is tight in absence of errors, meaning that the low-
level message reception signal occurs at approximately the same time in all nodes that
receive it. This feature can be made fully deterministic when operating from real-
time kernels. It is a crucial feature for the mechanism underlying the synchronization
algorithm.
 At the WAN level, a GPSs satellite system or any other global infrastructure can be
used as the \global network" link between local networks.
The integrated solution combines the LAN-level algorithm with the WAN-level ser-
vice in a hierarchical manner. This solution can be implemented on virtually any large-
scale distributed computing infrastructure as we see them today|such as the wide-area
point-to-point Internet.
Such a solution is presented in [98] for a system with a benign failure mode. An
adaptation for a malicious environment requires the use of several security mechanisms.
Communication has to be secure: message integrity and authenticity. The correctness of
sites with clocks has to be assessed in order to avoid a malicious clock from desynchronizing
others.
A clock synchronization protocol for a homogeneous network that tolerates mali-
cious faults has been presented by Barak et al. [8]. It relies on a completely connected
network with links between any two processors, and can withstand up to one third of
faulty processors at any time. Through the use of proactive secure mechanisms, an arbi-
trary number of faults is actually tolerated over the whole lifetime of the system.
Such solutions can be used in MAFTIA to synchronize the clocks of hosts without
a local TTCB. For hosts with a local TTCB, this component synchronizes its clock with
other local TTCBs and gives a Trusted Absolute Timestamping that can be used reliably
by hosts. The synchronism and security of the TTCB make the internal implementation
of clock synchronization algorithms simple.
2.3 Participant Level
2.3.1 Activity Support
Replication management
One of the goals of the MAFTIA middleware architecture is to provide fault-tolerant
services to clients for applications. The approach pursued here is to base fault-tolerance
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on replication. That is, the service is not oered by a single server but by a group of
servers, which oer the service collaboratively. From a clients' point of view, the replicated
service should behave just as if it were implemented by a single server. Achieving this is
highly non-trivial, in particular if some of the replicated servers are subject to crashes or
malicious attacks.
In general, one can distinguish between two forms of replication management: pas-
sive and active.
In a system with passive replication, there is a distinguished server among the
group of servers, who acts as the \master" or primary server, and executes all operations.
It receives a request from a client, processes it, and answers to the client. All the other
servers (the \slaves" or replicas) merely mirror the operations of the master, and do so
only when told by the master. This ensures that all replicas have the same internal state as
the primary and can take over as a new primary at any moment, should the primary fail.
This form of service replication works for arbitrary operations, including non-deterministic
ones.
The diÆculty with passive replication is the transition from one primary to the
next, because all servers need to agree on who the next primary is and which requests have
already been processed. Once this agreement is reached, the new primary continues with
processing the next available request. Additional problems arise should the primary be
corrupted and modify an honest client's request. The replicas need some way to verify the
primary's operations in this case, otherwise this approach cannot be used.
With active replication, all servers reach agreement on the requests to execute before
actually processing them. Clients are supposed to send their requests to all servers and
also receive answers from all servers; they can determine the result of the operation by
majority voting. This is usually called the \state machine replication paradigm" [86]. It
works only for services with deterministic operations, as otherwise the servers would not
be able to maintain the same state. Active replication requires that client requests are
delivered by the servers in a global order, which can be ensured by an disseminating client
requests using an atomic broadcast protocol.
Both forms of replication can be used in systems with arbitrary malicious faults. For
example, Castro and Liskov describe a system based on passive replication [24]. The ap-
proach of Reiter and Birman [79], the protocols of Doudou, Garbinato, and Guerraoui [37],
and the approach sketched in Section 2.2.2 are based on active replication.
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Key Management
All cryptographically secure protocols and services discussed above require some
key material to be present at each party.
In order to identify a party in the system, it is associated with the public key of
a signature scheme, for which the party must know the corresponding signing key. The
association of names to public keys can either be made once and for all in the initialization
data, or it can be done dynamically by a certicate using the system manager's public key.
This key has then to be known to all parties.
Once such a public-key infrastructure is in place, a symmetric key between each
pair of parties can be generated using standard cryptographic techniques: they establish a
secure session, one of them chooses a fresh authentication key, and sends it to the partner
over the encrypted link. This symmetric key can be used for authenticating the messages
between those parties using a MAC (message authentication code).
Keys for the threshold-cryptography protocols are needed as well. Since the individ-
ual key shares, which a party holds, are depending on the global public key of the schemes,
they cannot be generated individually, like the pairwise authentication keys. They must
either be generated by a trusted dealer or by a secure protocol among all parties.
Using a trusted dealer for initializing every party, of course, simplies the setup of
the system. Unfortunately, it also introduces a single point of failure and a prime target for
an attacker. However, a trusted dealer for initializing the system may be the only feasible
way of distributing the secret key material. If the system uses dynamic groups and new
parties may join a group at any time during operation, the dealer is needed continuously,
creating another undesirable vulnerability. If the system uses static groups, all information
available to the dealer should be destroyed as soon as the system is running.
There are protocols for distributed generation of the keys for threshold cryptosys-
tems and signature schemes in the cryptographic literature [43]. However, they are much
less practical than the threshold cryptosystems themselves because all protocols known
today rely on synchronous broadcast channels and are considerably more expensive than
the operations of the cryptosystems. True, broadcast channels can be simulated using
Byzantine agreement, and synchrony could be added using a trusted time service. But the
resulting protocols would not be very eÆcient and a trusted dealer might still be preferred.
From the security point of view, the dealer is only needed once for initialization, after all.
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Transactional Management
The transactional management service will provide transactions that are resilient
to intrusions, i.e. intrusion-tolerant transactions. The transactions will have reliable,
secure and exactly-once behaviour. The case studies have pointed out the need for such
transactions, for example the Tradezone case study describes a B2B
1
application that
requires intrusion-tolerant transactions in order to support the reliable and secure ordering
of goods from suppliers across open networks.
Initially the focus will be on tolerating outsider intrusions rather than insider intru-
sions. An outsider intrusion is an unauthorised increase in privilege, i.e. a change in the
1
business-to-business
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privilege of a user that is not permitted by the system's security policy. An insider intru-
sion is an abuse of privilege or misfeasance, i.e. an improper use of authorised operations.
For example, we want to prevent outsiders interacting with the transaction service in a way
for which they do not hold suÆcient privilege. Later, we intend to examine the problems
of making multi-party transactions tolerant to outsider intrusions, and also explore how
insider intrusions can be tolerated through the use of Coordinated atomic actions (CA
actions).
We have decomposed the transactional management service into multiple services
in the style of the CORBA object transaction service [70]. The architecture of the trans-
actional management service is represented in Figure 2.2 in which dependence relations
between the services are depicted. The \functional" services shown are: the transaction
coordination service, persistence service, and concurrency service. Other services such as
the replication management service, key management service, authorisation service and
communication services (including group communication, and Byzantine agreement) are
assumed to be already provided in the MAFTA middleware architecture and are described
elsewhere.
The transaction coordination service is a protocol engine that implements the proto-
cols for transactions, it drives all the other services in the implementation of transactions.
Besides implementing traditional transactional protocols it will ensure that only authorised
participants may interact with the transactional management service. The persistence ser-
vice makes durable the state of resources involved in the transactions, and also the state
of the transaction itself. The concurrency service manages the isolation of resources by
enforcing a locking scheme on them. This protects resources from participants who are not
members of the same transaction as the resources.
The replication management service, key management service, authorisation ser-
vice and communication services will be used to make the other services intrusion-tolerant.
Critical service components will be replicated which will increase the availability of the ser-
vices. Group communication and multi-valued byzantine agreement will be used to build
services that can tolerate the subversion of a certain proportion of replicated components.
Key management will be used to manage keys that will be used to establish secure channels
between participants, services and resources and authenticate participants. The authori-
sation service will be used to determine whether participants are authorised to participate
in certain transactions.
Once we have a good understanding of the issues surrounding implementing trans-
actions that tolerate outsider intrusions, we will investigate making Coordinated atomic
actions (CA actions) [106][107] tolerant to outsider intrusions. CA actions support multi-
party interactions and provide the capability to tolerate application-level faults as well as
reported unmasked low-level faults from the underlying system. We will require support
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for multi-party transactions in order to support more advanced application models where
multiple participants cooperate with each other and compete with external participants
for access to resources. For example, as in the telemedicine case study where multiple
participants come together to carry out a diagnosis and interact with both shared and
global resources.
CA actions will be implemented by an extended transaction management service.
This service will build on top of the initial transactional management service. The revised
architecture is shown in Figure 2.3. Intrusion-tolerant transactions will be used in order
to support competitive concurrency, and additional services will be introduced in order to
support the ability to deal with application-level faults (an exception handling service),
and coordinate the CA actions protocols (a CA actions coordination service).
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The CA actions coordination service is a protocol engine that implements the pro-
tocols for CA actions, it drives all the other services in the implementation of CA actions.
The exception handling service implements exception handling for distributed and concur-
rent exceptions. Such a service is required in order to support backward and forward error
recovery. The protocol used to handle distributed and concurrent exceptions will be based
on work in [108].
Again we propose using similar techniques as discussed in relation to intrusion-
tolerant transactions to make intrusion-tolerant CA actions.
We also intend to examine the problem of insider intrusion-tolerance. Insider in-
trusions tend to result from attacks at the application level rather than from attacks that
take place below the level of the application. We believe that one approach to tackling
this problem is to dene a boundary around insider actions and control information ows
between insiders and other resources and participants. We also require some way to deal
with application-level faults and institute backward or forward error recovery in order to
compensate for insider intrusions. CA actions give us a framework that is very close to
this, they allow boundaries to be drawn around multi-participant interactions and they
also have a framework for dealing with application-level faults. This may mean that an
intrusion-tolerant CA actions service might be used as a service to implement insider
intrusion-tolerance for itself (through recursive application) or for other services. This will
the focus of further work.
2.3.2 Example Usecases
We describe three possible applications of the middleware to develop some sophis-
ticated services. These are all services that must provide high security guarantees and
maintain safety and liveness in adversarial environments. In turn, they may be used to
build, or to support the execution, of distributed end-user applications. As an important
note, the denition of building blocks for the middleware Activity Support Services is not
a closed issue. As classes of functions or applications gain importance, to the point of jus-
tifying the denition of a set of support services, these may be included in the AS module,
in order to provide support to applications of that class.
The usecases discussed here are:
 a certication authority and directory service,
 an authentication service, and
 a digital notary service.
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These and other trusted third-party services are described in more detail in a companion
MAFTIA deliverable. A fully edged authorisation service will be described in a forth-
coming deliverable.
The distributed trusted services are based on secure state machine replication in
the Byzantine model (following [86, 79]). Requests to a particular service are delivered by
the broadcast protocols mentioned in Section 2.2.2. A broadcast is started when the client
sends a message containing the request to a suÆcient number of servers. In general, the
client must send the request to more than t servers or a corrupt server could simply ignore
the message; alternatively, one could postulate that one server acts as a gateway to relay
the request to all servers and leave it to the client to resend its message if it receives no
answer within the expected time.
Depending on whether it needs to maintain causality among client requests, a service
may use atomic broadcast directly or secure causal atomic broadcast otherwise. If the client
requests commute, reliable broadcast suÆces.
Each server returns a partial answer to the client, who must wait for at least 2t+1
values before determining the proper answer by majority vote. Since atomic broadcast
guarantees that all servers process the same sequence of requests, the client will obtain
the same answer from all honest servers. If the application returns a digital signature,
the answers may contain signature shares from which the client can recover a threshold
signature.
Certication Authority and Directory Service
A certication authority (CA) is a service run by a trusted organization that veries
and conrms the validity of public keys. It is the crucial element of every public-key
infrastructure (PKI). The issued certicates usually also conrm that the real-world user
dened in a certicate is in control of the corresponding private key. A certicate is simply
a digital signature under the CA's private signing key on the public key and the identity
(ID) claimed by the user.
The CA has published its own public key of a digital signature scheme. When a
user wants to obtain a certicate for his public key, he sends it together with his ID and
credentials to the CA. The ID might consist of name, address, email, date of birth, and
other data to uniquely identify the holder. Then the CA veries the credentials, produces
a certicate if they pass, and sends the answer back to the user. The user can verify his
certicate with the public key of the CA. For its certicates to be meaningful, the CA
must have a clearly stated and publicized policy that it follows for validating public keys
and IDs; this policy might change over time.
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A secure directory service maintains a database of entries, processes lookup queries,
and returns the answers authenticated by a signature under its private signing key. The
corresponding signature verication key is available to all clients. Several examples of
secure directories exist in distributed systems today and more are needed in the future,
such as authentication for the Internet's domain name system.
Internally, a secure directory works much like a CA: it receives a query, retrieves
some values from the stored database, generates a digital signature on the result, and sends
both back to the client. Additional functionality is needed for updating the database.
Both services can be implemented in our distributed system architecture. Requests
must be delivered by atomic broadcast to ensure that all servers return the same answers.
Updates to the database must be treated in the same way. The digital signature scheme
of the service is replaced by the corresponding threshold signature scheme, which requires
minimal changes to the clients in the case of [91]. In the server code, computing the digital
signature is replaced by generating a signature share.
Note that atomic broadcast is crucial for delivering any request that changes the
global state; only if a CA never changes its policy and all of its certicates are independent
of each other does it suÆce to use reliable broadcast.
Authentication Service
An authentication service veries the claimed identity of a user or of a process acting
on behalf of a user. The user must present secret information that identies her or carry out
a zero-knowledge identication protocol. If verication succeeds, the service will take some
action to grant the request, such as to establish a session or return a cryptographic token
for later use; this depends on the context in which the service is used. If the answer contains
a freshly generated, random session key, as in Kerberos [94], such an authentication server
is also called a key distribution center (KDC). Communication between the authentication
service and clients may be encrypted and signed with the public key of the service.
The security assumption about the authentication service is that it acts honestly
when verifying a password or an identication protocol and never grants a request without
having seen the proper identication. The reference data against which the verication
occurs is assumed to be public but immutable; this is the case for Unix-style password
authentication and for zero-knowledge identication protocols, for instance. But a KDC
based on symmetric-key cryptography must also protect the corresponding master secret
key.
A distributed authentication service consists of several authentication servers that
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are initialized by a trusted dealer and have access to the public reference data. Client
requests are distributed by atomic broadcast to all servers. If the request contains suÆcient
information to authorize the user, the service must produce a suitable cryptographic token.
We distinguish two cases for this, depending on whether the cryptographic token
uses public-key techniques or not:
 In a public-key scenario, the response of the authentication service is a digitally signed
message, which can be thought of as a specialized certicate. Thus, the threshold
signature protocols for a CA are used as described in Section 2.3.2.
 If symmetric-key cryptography is used, the servers maintain a shared master key and
the response consists of an encryption under the master key, just as in Kerberos. An
eÆcient non-interactive protocol to realize a distributed KDC was presented by Naor,
Pinkas, and Reingold [69]. The cryptographic mechanism underlying their protocol
is in fact the same as used for realizing the distributed coin-tossing scheme in our
Byzantine agreement protocol [18] and integrates nicely with our architecture.
As in the general approach, a client can assemble the cryptographic token from the answers
of all servers that authorizes her. Existing authorization protocols that use this token
require some minimal changes in the cryptographic algorithms.
Notary Service
In its simplest form, a digital notary service receives documents, assigns a sequence
number to them, and certies this by its signature. Such a service could, e.g., be used for
assigning Internet domain names or registering patent applications. A notary must process
requests sequentially and atomically; it updates its internal state for each request.
In many notary applications, the content of a request must remain condential until
the notary processes it in a single atomic step. For example, a competitor in the patent
application scenario might try to le a related patent application, have it processed rst,
and claim the invention for himself.
A distributed notary can be realized readily using our architecture since it involves
a simple state machine to be replicated. Client requests must be disseminated by secure
causal atomic broadcast to rule out any violation of their condentiality. For if no en-
cryption were used, a corrupted server could see the contents of the request during atomic
broadcast and arrange that the service schedules and processes a related request of the
adversary before the original one. The same attack is possible if the cryptosystem is not
secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks.
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As the answer of the notary service is a digitally signed message, clients obtain their
receipt as described before in the CA example.
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3 Verication and Assessment
Tom McCutcheon, William Simmonds, DERA, Malvern (UK)
Birgit Ptzmann, Matthias Schunter, Universitat des Saarlandes (D)
Michael Waidner, IBM Zurich Research Lab (CH)
3.1 Rigorous Security Model
The rst objective of verication and assessment in MAFTIA is to develop a formal,
mathematical model that allows precise denitions of the notions developed by the other
work packages. This objective has largely been achieved now.
3.1.1 General System Model
An essential part of this task was to give a precise model of systems. In this
model, we do not yet abstract from anything, because for any later abstraction, we want
to rigorously verify that we do not lose anything with respect to the real world. Hence the
system model must be probabilistic, and must allow certain security-specic aspects to be
expressed, such as security parameters and adversarial scheduling with realistic adversarial
information and power.
Such a model was given for the synchronous case in [72, 73] and in a forthcoming
report [74] for the asynchronous case. The only abstraction is that the model is digital,
i.e., vulnerabilities depending on analog system properties have to be considered separately.
For a detailed discussion of the related literature and why new models were needed, see
these papers; some related system models are [9, 67, 89, 21].
We now discuss how this rigorous model relates to the system model in Section 1
of this deliverable:
1. Several of the typical fault models from Section 1.1 have been explicitly formalized:
fail-stop (benign) and malicious faults, computationally restricted and unrestricted
adversaries, threshold and more general adversary structures, and static and dynamic
adversaries. The dierent aspects can be combined arbitrarily. The models are all
expressed as general transformations from \intended structures" (the planned error-
less system) to \actual structures" and thus hold for all protocols in the MAFTIA
architecture.
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2. Two types of synchrony (compare Section 1.2) have been formalized, a synchronous
model that nevertheless does not (unreasonably) assume that the adversary adheres
to any rules about timing, and an asynchronous model. The asynchronous model
(although we currently use it to express totally time-free real systems) is somewhat
more general in allowing local subscheduling. Partially timed models may be an
interesting addition in the future. The crucial protocols between the TTCBs may
in fact be expressible in the synchronous model already, except that we are using
discrete time.
3. Arbitrary topological models and interaction styles can be expressed in this formal-
ization. However, it may be useful in the future to give naming conventions for
certain topologies that occur often.
4. Group models are not visible at all in the general system model because they are
virtual concepts; they will turn up as properties of certain specic systems.
3.1.2 Security Notions
Before one can verify a system (with or without faults), one needs a specication,
i.e., one has to say what one wants to prove. In security, this may include both what
the system should do (integrity and availability) and what the adversary should not learn
(condentiality). The strongest denitions are those that include both aspects. This is
done by dening a reference system, often called ideal system or trusted host, and requiring
that the real system is, from the point of view of its users, indistinguishable from this ideal
system. Our model extends known cryptographic notions of indistinguishability to the
general reactive systems we dened.
1
Integrity can also be dened as individual properties (e.g., any message that is
accepted was previously sent). In the context of distributed protocols, such properties
are often formalized in temporal logic (see, e.g., [39]). We have therefore also provided a
denition of such integrity properties, extended by cryptographic aspects in [73].
Both styles of specication are adequate for the classes of protocols considered in
this deliverable and have been used before, either in a non-cryptographic version or not so
rigorously.
As a concrete example belonging to the MAFTIA middleware part, basic secure
channels (cf. Section 2.2.1) were specied in this model in the ideal-system style, both
synchronously and asynchronously. We believe that the methodology used to make this
1
However, how to include a form of availability in the asynchronous case is in general still an open
problem.
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specication is powerful enough to make further specications quite easily. (We also made
one for a higher-layer protocol.) Such specications correspond to precise API denitions
with additional guarantees; hence it may be useful to make several of them in the context
of API denitions in the next phase of WP2.
3.1.3 General Architecture Aspects
One of the main aspects of the MAFTIA middleware is layering. The basis for using
such a layering also in the verication and assessment is a so-called composition theorem:
Given the specication Sys
0
0
of a lower-layer system, one wants to design and prove higher-
layer protocols Sys
1
based solely on this specication. Now one expects that one can \plug
in" any secure real lower-layer system Sys
0
and the higher-layer protocol will still full its
own specication.
We have proven such a theorem for all our model variants. No such theorem was
known before for reactive cryptographic systems. (A non-reactive composition theorem
was proven in [20].) Hence the layered systems can indeed be proven layer-wise just as
they are designed, at least as far as ideal-host specications go. We have also shown that
integrity properties shown for the specication are also valid in the real systems.
These theorems are also an important step towards the third objective of verication
and assessment in MAFTIA, to investigate how validations made using formal methods and
abstractions from cryptographic primitives can be used to deduce security when provably
secure real cryptographic primitives are used instead of the abstractions: The ideal-host
specications can be abstract (and are indeed abstract in the examples so far). Hence real
systems can be replaced for abstract systems. However, these particular abstractions have
not yet been written in CSP, the specic formal method mainly used in MAFTIA.
3.1.4 Verication of Concrete Systems
We have rigorously veried protocols for basic secure channels, using asymmetric
encryption and signatures, in both the synchronous and the asynchronous model. This
was a particularly rigorous mathematical proof far beyond the usual level of detail in
cryptographic proofs, to make sure that all the aspects of the model really t together.
(Another such proof was made for a WP4-like protocol.)
We hope that the proof techniques developed can now be applied to prove further
protocols much faster, or one might again omit many of the details.
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Besides this specic work within the general model, individual MAFTIA protocols
were proved less rigorously by the people inventing them, e.g., those in Section 2.2.2.
3.2 Methods of Verication and Assessment
3.2.1 Use of CSP
This section is intended as a non-technical introduction to, and progress report on,
WP6's verication of MAFTIA protocols to date. It is taken from a more detailed technical
report that will appear as D4. That report will include full model scripts, documentation,
and technical details of CSP usage and modeling practices. For those readers who may
not be familiar with CSP, this section has been included as a very brief introduction to
the calculus, its usage and its applicability to the verication of large protocols as may be
found in WP2.
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP)[48] is a calculus for describing and
analyzing the behaviour of a collection of concurrent interacting processes or systems. The
CSP calculus is used to specify the nature of the process interactions { specically, how
communications between the constituent processes aect state and subsequent behaviour.
The foundation of the calculus is the notion of engagable `event' (or `action') primitive. A
process' set of engagable events is termed its `alphabet'. In the CSP algebra, processes can
be `put in parallel' so that their interaction is through simultaneous engagement in events
common to their alphabets
2
The emergence of automated tools in support of CSP - notably the FDR[59] re-
nement checker - has elevalated CSP beyond a theoretical, `academic' manual reasoning
language. CSP/FDR is now a widely-used, increasingly popular, formal verication tool
supported by a growing and constructive user-community. It can cite successful applica-
tions in elds as diverse as cryptography and industrial and military safety-case studies.
FDR can be used to check for anomolous behaviour such as non-determinism, dead-
lock, and divergence. However, it is more usually used as a renement checker - i.e. to
verify that all behaviours of an `implementation' process are behaviours of a `specication'
process (or, put another way, that \the implementation meets its spec".)
CSP/FDR is backed by some impressive theoretical results. Arguably the most
notable of the more recent theoretical advancements has been in the eld of CSP-oriented
data independence theory (D.I.)[57]. If a model written in FDR's machine-readable dialect
2
In the following sections we also refer to processes being `interleaved'. This means they have no shared
events and so cannot communicate with each other and have no 'memory' or `state' in common.
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of CSP, CSP-m, is to be compileable by FDR, then it must be nite-state, and, in particular,
the model's data types must be nite types. The data independence theory sometimes
allows us to extrapolate the formal verication of a process parameterized by a particular
nite instance of a type, to arbitrary instances of that type.
CSP-m is `untimed-CSP' and it is non-proabalistic { i.e. the CSP-m algebra has
no intrinsic notion of either timing or probability. Accordingly, various discrete timing
abstractions have arisen in the CSP-user community to become more or less `standard
practice' CSP.
Casper[58] and ProBE[60] are two other notable CSP support tools. The former
is a front-end to FDR. It allows the user to specify point-to-point key protocols in a
high-level, literate language designed so as to be familiar to researchers in the security-
protocol community. Casper generates compileable CSP-m models from the high-level
specs. ProBE is probably best described as a `CSP animator', it allows the user to easily
investigate the possible behaviours of a process that would otherwise be determined by the
process environment.
One of the issues of CSP/FDR usage that is particularly pertinent to the verication
of WP2 protocols is `state-space explosion'. State-space explosion is a problem that will
be familiar to many users of automated model-checking tools, and users of the FDR tool
are not excepted. This is explored more fully in Section 3.2.3.
We can expect the major WP2 protocols to be quite complex, and, very possi-
bly, multi-layered protocols that utilize lower-level crypto `primitives'. Inevitably state-
explosion is going to be a big issue in the verication of these protocols. It is likely that
we shall have to factor the larger WP2 protocols into smaller, more manageable `chunks'
that are amenable to verication by an automated checker such as FDR. This, of course,
raises the question of composition. The Trusted Host theory and its transcription to CSP
is certainly very pertinent to this, as is the work on the CSP modeling and analysis of the
High Level Architecture (HLA) component integration standard[3].
3.2.2 Selection of MAFTIA Protocols for Verication
The protocol verication work to date has primarily focused on the CSP verication
of the Certied Mail, Contract Signing, and Asynchronous Binary Byzantine Agreement
(ABBA) protocols. These protocols were selected because of their availability and the fact
that they are intrinsic to the MAFTIA architecture.
We found these four protocols technically varied and challenging.
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All four protocols provide for `core services' that are liable to be used directly
or indirectly in a MAFTIA environment. The Contract Signing protocols come in both
synchronous and asynchronous communications versions. All the protocols were required
to be veried for an arbitrary number of parties, transactions, etc. and all can suer faulty
or malicious behavior. Care must be taken in the abstraction from protocols, especially in
the abstraction of adversarial behavior.
The verication of the ABBA protocol would be required to address a number of
very interesting and challenging `data independence' and probabilistic issues.
A Byzantine protocol, such as ABBA, is of particular interest to WP6 because
the protocol's fault tolerance is in its being able to withstand the possible malfunction
or corruption of a particular percentage of the participant parties. In ABBA's case, that
percentage is the theoretical maximum, which is less than 33% of the parties. This is a good
example of the concept of fault tolerance through redundancy. The verication of ABBA
would require original work on the formulation, in CSP, of widely used (N,K,T)-threshold
schemes
3
.
3.2.3 Discussion of Key Modeling Issues
State-Space Explosion
From the point of view of the CSP user community, the problem of state-space
explosion arises when the Labeled Transition System (LTS) representing the CSP-m dened
process becomes impracticably large { either too large for FDR to compile in the rst place,
or too large to perform renement checks on
4
.
State-space explosion was a major issue in the verication of the asynchronous
Contract Signing protocol. The asynchrony of the communication medium was modeled
by `intercepting' and `buering', for arbitrary lengths of time, the messages sent between
parties. If M, say, was the datatype representing the message-space, then our buer could
be in any one of 2
card(M)
dierent states at any time. In one of our models of a contract
signing session between two correct signatories there were potentially 115 dierent messages
that could be sent between the signatories. On the face of it, this would necessitate the
compilation of a CSP process of no less than 2
115
states. Clearly this was infeasible, and
we were faced with the problem of substantially reducing the large state-space without
3
Such as the (N,2N/3,N/3) signature and coin-tossing schemes employed by ABBA. The CSP abstrac-
tion of these schemes would need to be data independent in the number of parties, N, if there was to be
any chance of formally verifying the protocol for arbitrary large N.
4
The problem is usually, but not always, the result of a large degree of non-determinacy.
64
weakening the verication.
The solution to this was to `re-name' all those messages that we supposed would
never be sent in practice to a single `error message' - thereby reducing the eective message-
space to a more managable size (about  2
10
in the above example). This was done in
such a way that if we had falsely constrained the possible message traces, then this would
be visible in our renement tests.
The solution required very few amendments to our original models. Moreover,
it could not be criticised for making any a-priori assumptions that we would otherwise
have wanted to prove { an invalid supposition as to which messages would be sent would
be manifest in the renement checks. It was very eective in reducing state-space to
manageable proportions, and, to date it has proved largely suÆcient for our needs.
FDR's Set Handling
FDR's set handling is generally agreed to be one of its less strong features. This
is manifest particularly when sets appear as parameters in process denitions, aggravating
compilation time, sometimes quite dramatically.
To be fair, it is very debatable whether the FDR tool can be very much improved
in its set handling capabilities. Sets, particularly when they appear as process parameters,
are usually unavoidably expensive to maintain and manipulate internally
5
.
We used a simple { but nonetheless eective { technique to speed-up compilation
of the model of the asynchronous Contract Signing protocol. The state-space reduction
strategy described in the last section reduced the number of possible states of this model to
more manageable proportions, but we were still left with a somewhat lengthy compilation
time due to the unstructured set parameter, BUFFER, of cardinality  2
10
. We used
FDR's renaming facility to re-specify the process that referred to the single BUFFER
parameter as card(BUFFER) `interleaved' processes each referring to only singleton set
parameters.
A few other common modeling techniques were employed to further speed up compi-
lation time. One of these uses re-naming to simplify processes with non-variable parameters
(usually some sort of `node identier').
5
There are 2
n
possible sets in the elements of a type of order n. The problem stems from the fact that
FDR has no means of knowing whether it can `lazily compile' a process with structured or unstructured
sets as parameters. That is, although in some contexts it may be that compilation is only necessary for a
small fraction of the 2
n
possible sets, FDR cannot know in advance what those sets might be.
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Type Abstraction
Abstraction can be a very contentious issue in formal modeling. However, with the
type of protocol verication that WP6 is concerned with - as opposed to highly subjective
`real-world' scenarios { abstraction is not so problematic. Here, we are validating well-
dened interactive algorithms that manipulate well-dened types.
One of the challenges is to convincingly simplify those types. Whatever we do, we
must not over simplify a type to the extent that we falsely constrain control ow that
would otherwise have been dependent on the results of operations or predicates performed
on that type.
Among the more signicant types that WP6 has been required to abstract to date
are: crypto-signatures; threshold coin-tossing and signature schemes; transaction identi-
ers; contract bodies; and mail bodies.
Both Saarland and DERA teams abstracted the contracts, mail bodies and transac-
tion identiers to simple two-element types. To those readers who may not be so familiar
with formal methods, this simplication may appear to be rather na

ive, however the simpli-
cation is, in fact, quite easily justied by the fact that the only operation or predicate that
was ever performed by the protocols on any of these three types was testing for equality.
We had to be slightly more careful when abstracting the crypto-signature schemes.
Here we had little choice other than to read \is computationally infeasible to forge a sig-
nature" to mean, simply, \is unforgeable". Although this type of simplication is widely
acknowledged in the formal methods community, it does exemplify the fundamental dier-
ence between the `nite-state' and `crypto' approaches to validation
6
. Once we maintained
that a crypto-signature scheme was unforgeable, then abstracting from the scheme was
reasonably straightforward.
Our models of the contract-signing and certied mail protocols refer to only three
parties, i.e. two correctly behaving or `honest' parties, and one faulty, possibly `malicious'
party. This was because the protocols need, at least, to be veried for two correct parties,
and for one correct and one faulty party in the case when the correct party initiated the
session, and in the case when the faulty party initiated the session.
The argument that this verication could then be extrapolated to an arbitrary nite
number of parties is a familiar one. It relied on our assuming that the signature scheme
is unforgeable, and on the fact that the transaction identiers are unique to a session
7
. In
6
The Trusted Host theory addresses the problem of bridging the two approaches.
7
From the verication point of view, this means that we can `re-use' TIDs after verifying that a session
was `safely' conducted.
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short, this meant that a multi-party Contract Signing process could be modelled simply
as the interleaving of a number of 2-party processes
8
.
Modeling Faulty or Malicious Behavior
For the non-ABBA protocols, the modeling of a faulty, potentially malicious, process
was really quite simple. We made no distinction between an `intelligent' and `unintelli-
gent' adversary { our adversary was free to do anything within certain specic constraints
imposed by the protocols.
In practice, this meant that a `faulty' party F, say, was basically given a `free
run' to input and output at will. The only constraints being that the messages that
were output by F could not be `forgeries'. For the contract-signing protocols, this meant
that F was limited to outputting only those messages it could have legitimately `deduced'
from messages previously received (by signing previously received messages any number of
times). F's initial message-set (or `knowledge' set) was the set of all those messages signed
only by F.
The problem with this type of adversary abstraction is, again, one of potential
state-space explosion. Fortunately, we are largely covered here by the deployment of the
state-space reduction strategy as described at the beginning of this section
9
.
Issues specic to ABBA
The verication of the ABBA protocol proved, as we expected, to be a very chal-
lenging exercise, and has accounted for the bulk of the DERA WP6 team's work eort to
date.
There were several good reasons why we expected the ABBA verication to be
more problematic than that of the other protocols. Firstly, there is no `obvious' means
by which we can extrapolate a verication of ABBA for some xed N, N=4
10
, say, to the
general multi-party case (as we did for the Contract-Signing and Certied Mail protocols
as described in 3.2.3). Secondly, one of the properties we want to verify for ABBA is
a probability of any particular party deciding `yes' or `no' in any particular round { but
probability is not naturally visible through renement testing in the failures-divergences
8
And that the verication of the multi-party process would be a corollary of the verication of a 2-party
process.
9
In this context, it is a variant of the well-known `lazy spy' abstraction
10
Four being a familiar lower threshold for N in many Byzantine Agreement protocols.
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model that underlies FDR.
The `topology' of ABBA is deceptively simple. It is easy to think of a `proof' of
ABBA only in terms of `numbers of parties', and to forget that there are, in fact, not one,
but two, potentially unbounded types. These are the parties P, say, and the rounds R. The
topology that we must model, then, is of a fully-connected `grid' of parties for each round,
with the `nodes' of the grid for round r, say, being mapped one-one to nodes of the grid
for round r+1.
Verifying ABBA for `only' particular values of P, then, would be no trivial matter
in itself { as we would still have to account for the fact that the number of rounds that the
protocol might run for is unbounded.
The rst problem was to model a single round of the ABBA protocol data-independently
of P. CSP data independence theory would then allow us to extrapolate the positive result
of a renement test pertaining to a particular nite instantiation of the type P, to arbitrary
P.
To appreciate some of the subtleties involved in modeling a single round of ABBA,
it is necessary to go into a little detail about how ABBA works. In each round of the ABBA
protocol, two ballots are held. In each of these ballots, the parties cast a vote for `yes',
for `no', or explicitly abstain. An `honest' party waits until it has received 2N/3 `justied'
(or authenticated) votes and `decides' for yes or no if and when, in some round, those
votes are all for one of the two values yes or no. ABBA compels the adversarial parties
to abide by the voting rules by the use of two-thirds signature and coin-tossing schemes.
All the parties have to `justify' their voting for a particular value in a ballot by having
collected 2N/3 distinct signature or coin shares sent with the votes of a previous ballot.
The problem, then, was to model one party's `collection' of two-thirds of the signature and
coin-tossing shares data-independently of P, in particular, this meant without referring to
card(P).
We omit details of this modeling. We mention only that it involved the parties
non-deterministically selecting a `recipient' party to whom they would then `send' their
votes. The current `recipient' would then set-theoretically collect the votes sent to it as
they `came in', discarding every one in three. A special vote of `NULL' was introduced
which allowed a party to indicate that it had no vote to cast as yet. This surprisingly
simple abstraction was all that was required in order to model the asynchronicity of the
comms medium.
The above model had to be amended to take into account certain `opportunistic'
adversarial behavior in which malfunctioning or corrupted parties could sometimes `lie' and
tell one honest party that they were voting for `yes', for example, whilst telling another
honest party that they were abstaining. This could only happen when the adversary could
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establish whether or not a two-thirds majority existed for `yes' (or for `no'). The model of
this behaviour is really quite simple and succinct, but we omit details here.
A single round of the ABBA protocol was then modeled as:
k p : P @NODE(p) { i.e. NODE(p) processes in shared parallel indexed over the parties p
of P, where the `NODE(p)' process is a single-round of the protocol from party p's `point
of view'.
Unfortunately this meant that we could not use traditional D.I. theory to establish
even single-round properties of the protocol as the theory disallows use of the shared parallel
operator (i.e. k) indexed over the type in question (in this case P)
11
. We can get around this,
however, by using recently developed `Data Independent Induction' theory[32]
12
. This said,
there are good technical reasons why the application of this theory is not so straightforward
if we are to incorporate in the inductive reasoning the model of the adversarial behavior
cited above.
Our modeling of the single round of ABBA is a quite accurate, truthful abstraction
of the protocol's behavior in practice. The danger now is that the quite complex theory that
is necessary to build-up a full model of a run of the protocol in terms of contiguous single-
rounds will begin to obfuscate that abstraction. The challenge is not in delivering some
form of veriable model of ABBA, but in delivering a veriable model that is reasonably
accessible and not over abstracted. The model must not suppose too many facts that may
be `obvious' only to those that are more familiar with the niceties of the protocol.
ABBA's probabilistic Fast Convergence property, cited at the beginning of this
section, is not amenable to proof by renement testing as probabilities are not visible in
the CSP failures-divergence model. Nevertheless, once one has become reasonably familiar
with the ABBA protocol, it is not diÆcult to see why Fast Convergence holds, and we are
condent of being able to transcribe this property in the model.
Correlation between Models and Protocols
In this year's WP6 work, correlation between models and protocols has not been a
particularly big issue. The challenge with transcribing Trusted Host based verications in
terms of CSP is, interestingly, to elucidate the mappings of formal state machine specs to
11
As it would allow the cardinality of the type to be calculated, and this, in turn, could be used
surreptitiously to inuence control ow.
12
This theory necessitates formulating a `SUPERSTATE' process that represents a partially completed
view of a round of the protocol. These partially completed SUPERSTATES appear in a family of `base-
case' and `step-case' renement tests that build-up to a proof that the shared-parallel process indeed
satises its spec.
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CSP models, rather than correlating a purely `natural language' spec with a CSP model.
Correlation is perhaps more contentious in our verication of the ABBA protocol. In the
case of ABBA, we must take care that in inferring the `obvious' from the paper specication,
we do not lose sight of the mechanics of the actual protocol.
We anticipate correlation being a more sensitive issue in future work { where we
can expect to have to justify the formal verication of much larger architecture solutions
and protocols.
3.2.4 Anticipated Results and Potential Issues
Our verication to date has not revealed any major errors in the protocols. This
said, we wish to stress that there is some modeling outstanding.
The verication did reveal a few very minor specication ambiguities and implicit
environment assumptions
13
. This could help to tighten future specications intended for
publication.
It is intended to complete the verication and writing-up of the Contract Signing
and Certied Mail protocols. This will be reported on in D4.
We will discuss details of ABBA with the protocol authors with the intention of
selecting the best form of verication. We will implement this and report on our ndings
in D4.
Although our nal model of ABBA may not be as clear-cut as we originally hoped,
we are condent of delivering a reasonably well balanced package that demonstrates the
capability of CSP/FDR to validate MAFTIA protocols.
13
Pertaining to the choice of `initiating' process and the nature of communications between signatories
and TTP.
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4 Conclusion
This deliverable presents three main contributions to the specication of the MAF-
TIA middleware architecture:
 System Model : a detailed discussion on the several models upon which the sys-
tem architecture is conceived. The models that were considered include the fault,
synchrony, topological and group models.
 Architecture : the building blocks and services of the MAFTIA middleware architec-
ture. The architecture was divided into two levels, the site and participant levels,
each containing a set of interdependent layers oering the various services.
 Verication and Assessment : an introduction, which will be extended in other de-
liverables, of a formal security model and methods of verication that will be used
to validate the MAFTIA middleware architecture.
In the next deliverable of WP2, D24, this specication will be further rened with
the precise specication of the APIs and protocols used to access and implement the various
services.
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